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NORM CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
WHITHER HUMAN RIGHTS? 
MARKO MILANOVIĆ* 
INTRODUCTION 
Two incontestable features of modern international law – the 
multiplicity of its law-making processes and the ever-increasing variety of 
the subject-matter that it seeks to regulate – have one invariable 
consequence: the increasing likelihood of norm conflict, part of the 
phenomenon of fragmentation of international law. Much work has been 
devoted to this topic, and, as is well known, it has already been the object 
of a comprehensive study by the International Law Commission (ILC).1 
Unlike much of the theoretical work on the subject, this article 
attempts to deal with the practicalities of norm conflict. Like the ILC 
Study, it will try to further develop the toolbox that judges and lawyers 
have at their disposal when dealing with cases involving a collision of 
norms.2 It will do so by focusing on situations in which one of the 
conflicting rules is a rule of human rights law, and, more specifically, on 
those norm conflicts in which some other international rule, for instance a 
UN Security Council resolution, attempts to prevail over or is at the very 
least equal to a human rights norm. Such cases of norm conflict are 
becoming more and more frequent and deal with matters of great political 
importance, such as the targeted sanctions against or the preventative 
detention of suspected terrorists. 
There are several other reasons for this emphasis on human rights. 
First, human rights norms operate not only between states, but also between 
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 1. Int’l L. Comm’n [ILC], Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized 
by Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter ILC Study]. 
 2. See id. para. 20. 
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states and individuals. This does not mean that human rights law is not 
about inter-state obligations, but that it is not reducible to synallagmatic 
bargains between states.3 Second, because of the community interest and 
values that human rights norms enshrine, norm conflict situations involving 
human rights are, as we shall see, frequently considered to be of 
constitutional importance, even though human rights norms are per se not 
hierarchically superior to other norms of international law. These conflicts 
inspire the use of the language of constitutionalism – very fashionable these 
days4 – which can be observed in most of the cases that we will examine. 
Third, a focus on human rights is useful since, for public international 
lawyers, human rights (and human rights lawyers) are one of the principal 
culprits of fragmentation.5 To the generalist, the human rights lawyer’s6 
misguided belief that wishful thinking is a law-making process and 
tendency toward what Alain Pellet calls droit de l’hommisme lead him to 
assert that the special nature of human rights somehow warrants deviations 
from general international law.7 From a generalist perspective, the human 
rightist penchant for special solutions is deeply troubling, since it disrupts 
the systemic quality of general international law. Human rights norm 
conflicts thus expose not only the various constitutionalist agendas and 
projects, but also the universalist agenda espoused by general international 
lawyers. 
As stated above, this article will examine those normative conflicts 
where a putatively hierarchically superior norm attempts to override or 
prevail over a conflicting human rights norm. Both in practice and in the 
literature, the posture is usually the other way around – it is human rights 
 
 3. See generally James Crawford, Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law, 319 
RECUEIL DES COURS 325 (2006); Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in 
International Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 217 (1994); Bruno Simma, International Human Rights 
and General International Law: A Comparative Analysis, IV-2 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACAD. OF 
EUR. LAW 153 (1993). 
 4. Sir Michael Wood, The Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures: The UN Security Council and 
International Law, First Lecture: The Legal Framework of the Security Council para. 17 (Nov. 7, 2006), 
available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/2006_hersch_lecture_1.pdf. 
 5. See Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 567-70 (2002). See also Arnold N. Pronto, ‘Human-Rightism’ and 
the Development of General International Law, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 753 (2007) (arguing that 
international human rights norms are increasingly “mainstreamed” into general international law). 
 6. Labels such as “generalists,” “human rights lawyers” or “European lawyers” are nothing more 
than very broad generalizations, and are used in this article simply as convenient shorthand. 
 7. Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 5, at 569. Two prominent examples are the various 
arguments put forward in favor of special rules for reservations and succession to human rights treaties. 
See, e.g., Menno Kamminga, State Succession in Respect of Human Rights Treaties, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
469 (1996); RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION REGIME: 
CONFLICT, HARMONY OR RECONCILIATION (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2004). 
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that (supposedly) override other rules, not vice versa. One concept in 
particular is often invoked in that regard, especially by scholars – jus 
cogens, the body of peremptory norms of international law, most of which 
deal with human rights.8 
However, even a casual survey of the jurisprudence would show that 
jus cogens is used rarely, if ever, to invalidate supposedly conflicting 
norms. On the contrary, courts generally exhibit a tendency to do what they 
can to avoid norm conflicts. To my knowledge there is perhaps only one, 
rightfully much-maligned case9 where jus cogens was successfully invoked 
to resolve a norm conflict,10 and even in that case it is not entirely clear 
whether it was decided on norm conflict grounds.11 Hence, as Ian Brownlie 
famously put it, jus cogens is like a car which has never left the garage.12 It 
much more frequently figures as a rhetorical device or as a ‘weapon of 
deterrence,’13 an incentive to courts to avoid a conflict through 
 
 8. For perhaps the most far-reaching example, see ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY 
NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). To the present author, at least, Prosper Weil’s warning against 
“seeking to create today the law of tomorrow’s international society” is as cogent as ever. Prosper Weil, 
Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 442 (1983). 
 9. See Judicial Decisions, 14 ITALIAN Y. B. INT’L L. 341, 341 (2004) (providing relevant text of 
Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Cass., sez. un., 11 mar. 2004, n.5044). For analysis of the 
decision, see Pasquale De Sena & Francesca De Vittor, State Immunity and Human Rights: the Italian 
Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 89 (2005); Andrea Gattini, War 
Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini Decision, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 224 (2005). 
 10. The case that is most often cited as using jus cogens as a rule of norm conflict resolution is the 
House of Lords decision in Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte 
Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.). For example, even the ILC states that in 
that case “for the first time a local domestic court denied immunity to a former Head of State on the 
grounds that there cannot be any immunity against prosecution for breach of jus cogens.” ILC Study, 
supra note 1, para. 371. However, though the reasoning of the seriatim opinions of their Lordships in 
Pinochet is notoriously difficult to decipher, the holding of the House was emphatically not that jus 
cogens invalidated any conflicting rules on state immunity. This is confirmed, inter alia, by their 
Lordships’ decision in Jones v. Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 
270, 298 (appeal taken from Eng.), where they interpreted Pinochet as holding that the Convention 
against Torture waived or created an exception to immunities ratione materiae for the crime of torture. 
Jus cogens had precisely nothing to do with it. See also Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
35763/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (21 November 2001), available through HUDOC database at http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (holding by 9 votes to 8 that the jus cogens prohibition of torture did 
not conflict with the law of state immunity). 
 11. See Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 491, 
500-01 (2008) (arguing that Ferrini was decided on a wider notion of international public order). 
 12. CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 175 (Antonio Cassese & Joseph 
H. H. Weiler eds., 1988). 
 13. Prosper Weil, Le droit international en quête de son identité, 237 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 278 
(1992-VI) (referring to jus cogens as “an arme de dissuasion – l’arme nucléaire, en quelque sorte, du 
système international.”) 
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interpretation, instead of resolve it on the basis of normative hierarchy.14 
Thus, as we will see, with regard to conflict resolution based on hierarchy, 
Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, stipulating the primacy of state 
obligations under the Charter over their other international obligations, is of 
much greater practical relevance. 
This article is organized as follows. Part I will briefly outline the 
analytical framework from which the rest of the study will proceed. Part II 
will address Article 103 of the Charter as a rule of conflict resolution and 
the recent relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
House of Lords, and the courts of the European Union. Part III will then 
examine how norm conflicts test some of the basic assumptions about what 
exactly constitutes an autonomous legal order. The final part concludes. 
I. DEFINITIONS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The analysis in the following sections of this article must necessarily 
start from a working framework, which will be explained and defended 
here as much as space allows. What first needs to be defined is the very 
notion of a conflict of norms, norms themselves being seen as legally 
binding rules establishing certain rights and obligations between subjects of 
international law. The notion of conflict will be defined broadly: a 
relationship of conflict exists between two norms “if one norm constitutes, 
has led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other.”15 
It is possible to adopt a narrower conception of conflict as concerning 
only those situations in which a state would be bound by two contradictory 
obligations, and not those situations in which one norm sets out an 
obligation while the other sets out a right of the state. According to some 
authors, this latter scenario does not qualify as a proper norm conflict, since 
the state can choose not to exercise its right pursuant to one norm, and thus 
 
 14. There are several reasons why this is so. Most importantly, jus cogens is a blunt instrument. Its 
sanction is drastic: the invalidation of the conflicting norm. If this norm is contained in a treaty, the 
sanction is even worse: the whole treaty goes, even if the impugned norm is only a very small part 
thereof. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 53, 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT]. Furthermore, not only is the sanction of jus cogens drastic, but it also 
limits the type of arguments than can be made in resolving the conflict. As soon as it is established that 
norm X has the status of jus cogens and conflicts with norm Y, all discussions are over. There can be no 
balancing of interests, no competing considerations than can be put forward. Witness, for example, how 
one advocate of a broad use of jus cogens sees the matter: “there is no scientific or intellectual value in 
attempts to influence the hierarchy of norms debate by invoking the hypothetical risks [of prejudice to 
the cooperation between states if sovereign immunity is denied] examined above. The issue of hierarchy 
of norms is an issue of legal science.” Alexander Orakhelashvili, State Immunity and Hierarchy of 
Norms: Why the House of Lords Got It Wrong, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 955, 957 (2007). 
 15. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW 
RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 175-76 (2003). 
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comply with its obligation from the other, while in the case of two 
conflicting obligations the state has no choice but to breach one of its 
obligations.16 
However, as well explained by Pauwelyn,17 this rigid approach 
mistakes one possible solution for a norm conflict – the fact that it can to an 
extent be avoided – with the actual existence of the conflict. Forcing the 
state to refrain from exercising one of its rights could thus lead to the 
frustration of the permissive norm equally as with an obligatory one. 
Therefore, the conception of conflict adopted in this article will be a wide 
one, encompassing not only cases of incompatibility of two obligations, but 
also conflicts between obligations and permissive norms. 
A further distinction that must be made is between apparent and 
genuine norm conflicts, and consequently between conflict avoidance on 
the one hand, and conflict resolution on the other. An apparent conflict is 
one where the content of the two norms is at first glance contradictory, yet 
the conflict can be avoided, most often by interpretative means. There is a 
powerful tendency in international law toward harmonization and systemic 
integration that abhors conflicts and seeks to avoid them. Presumptions 
against conflict and techniques of harmonious interpretation are thus often 
used by courts, explicitly18 or implicitly.19 
Yet there are instances in which all techniques of conflict avoidance 
will fail, and a genuine, as opposed to an apparent, conflict will emerge.20 
These true norm conflicts are those that cannot be avoided, but which it 
might be possible to resolve. Unlike avoidance, which interprets away any 
incompatibility, resolution requires one conflicting norm to prevail or have 
priority over another. Moreover, for a genuine conflict to be truly resolved 
it is necessary not only for one norm to have priority, but also for the 
wrongfulness on the part of the state for failing to abide by the displaced 
norm to be precluded as a matter of state responsibility. It is only if the 
 
 16. See C. Wilfred Jenks, Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401 (1953). 
 17. See PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 184-88 (identifying different types of conflict situations). 
See also ILC Study, supra note 1, para. 24 (noting both the basic and looser understandings of 
incompatibility in norm conflicts); Erich Vranes, The Definition of ‘Norm Conflict’ in International 
Law and Legal Theory, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 395 (2006) (arguing that the narrow definition of “norm 
conflict” is insufficient in legal theory). 
 18. See, e.g., Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 357/63/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 55 (21 
November 2001), available through the HUDOC database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc 
(“The Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international 
law of which it forms part, including those relating to the grant of State immunity.”). 
 19. See ILC Study, supra note 1, para. 37; PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 240-44. 
 20. See PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 272 (“Interpretation may solve apparent conflicts; it cannot 
solve genuine conflicts.”). 
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state bears no legal cost for disregarding one of its commitments in favor of 
another that a norm conflict has truly been resolved. 
Crucially, international law lacks the key method for resolving 
genuine norm conflict that is used in domestic law: a centralized system 
with a developed hierarchy, and at that a hierarchy based on the sources of 
norms.21 Thus, in domestic systems a constitutional norm will prevail over 
a statutory one,22 while legislation will ordinarily prevail over executive 
orders or decrees. Not so in international law, where all sources of law are 
generally considered equal.23 Though a treaty will usually prevail over 
custom, this is so only because the customary rule is jus dispositivum, 
meaning that it can be contracted out of, and applies only by default if the 
parties in question have not agreed differently.24 But the treaty is also jus 
dispositivum, and can equally be amended or abrogated by subsequent 
treaty or custom. In international law, the only true instances of hierarchy 
are the very limited number of norms of jus cogens, such as the prohibition 
of genocide or the prohibition of torture. Such norms invalidate any other 
conflicting norm, though, as we have seen above, such invalidation rarely, 
if ever, happens in practice, and can only be superseded by a subsequent 
norm of equal status.25 
Moreover, domestic legal systems are centralized in the sense that 
even in domestic systems with plural legislators, such as federations, there 
are predetermined rules about the supremacy of norms passed by these 
different legislators. In the United States, for example, the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution provides that the Constitution itself and any law 
made in pursuance thereof shall prevail over contrary state law.26 United 
States courts have developed an exceptionally complex federalism 
jurisprudence, whose main purpose is to avoid or resolve norm conflicts 
between federal law and state law.27 Though federal law is hierarchically 
 
 21. See Dinah Shelton, International Law and ‘Relative Normativity’, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
145 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003) (analyzing the three current topics of debate concerning relative 
normativity). 
 22. Of course, even within a centralized and hierarchical system, courts often employ techniques 
of harmonious interpretation so as to avoid conflict. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 
(2001) and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (employing the interpretative canon of 
constitutional avoidance, that statutes should read so far as is possible in such a way as to be compatible 
with the Constitution). 
 23. See PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 94-96. 
 24. See Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 55, 58 (1966). 
 25. See VCLT, supra note 14, arts. 53, 64. See also PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 278-82. 
 26. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 27. See, e.g., Symposium, Ordering State-Federal Relations Through Federal Preemption 
Doctrine, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (2008). 
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superior to state law, it has this preemptive effect only if enacted pursuant 
to the limited grant of powers given to the federal government by the 
Constitution. 
In international law, the only analogous situation is that of law-making 
within international organizations, which were granted certain powers by a 
treaty between their member states. Accordingly, if a body of an 
organization, for example the United Nations, has some sort of law-making 
capacity, that capacity is necessarily limited by its constituent instrument. 
Thus, a resolution passed by the UN Security Council in violation of the 
UN Charter would be ultra vires and therefore void – an issue which I will 
address later.28 
In all other cases, the principal legislators of international law, nearly 
two hundred states, are sovereign equals. They are, moreover, equals who 
are exercising their powers through multiple, heterogeneous law-making 
processes, during which they rarely take into account the possibility of 
conflict with other norms or legal regimes.29 As a consequence, most of the 
methods for conflict resolution that are applied in domestic systems are less 
useful in international law.30 Moreover, the plural legislators of the diffuse 
international legal system are perfectly capable of making contradictory 
commitments, and to presume coherence in the intent of states in all 
circumstances would fly in the face of reality.31 Therefore, in international 
law it is conceptually entirely possible for norm conflicts to exist that are 
both unavoidable and unresolvable. 
With this basic framework in mind, let us now turn to Article 103 of 
the Charter and the first cases of human rights norm conflict to be 







 28. See PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 96, 285-90. 
 29. On conflict clauses in treaties, see generally Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty 
Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 573, 584-87 (2005) (addressing drafting techniques for 
avoiding treaty conflicts); ILC Study, supra note 1, paras. 267-71 (analyzing conflict-clauses in 
treaties). 
 30. See Shelton, supra note 21, at 147. 
 31. See ILC Study, supra note 1, para. 34 (“There is no single legislative will behind international 
law. Treaties and custom come about as a result of conflicting motives and objectives – they are 
“bargains” and “package-deals” and often result from spontaneous reactions to events in the 
environment.”). 
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II. ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
POWERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
A. Scope and Effects of Article 103 
Article 103 of the Charter reads as follows: 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail. 
Article 103 is unique in international practice. It is not limited merely 
to prohibiting inter se agreements between member states, or the 
conclusion of conflicting treaties, as was the case, for example, with Article 
20 of the League of Nations Covenant.32 Generally speaking, when states 
conclude treaties that conflict with a previous multilateral treaty to which 
they are a party, but which do not abrogate the latter, they incur 
responsibility for such an action. However, though this second treaty might 
be contrary to the provisions of an earlier one, and thus ‘illegal’, it is not 
thereby invalidated and still has legally binding force as the product of 
valid state consent.33 Therefore, the fact that an earlier treaty prohibited the 
conclusion of the latter treaty would not in itself constitute an excuse for a 
state for its failure to perform this new treaty – after all, it freely consented 
to it. 
Article 103 is distinct in three respects that jointly make it the only 
truly meaningful prospective conflict clause. First, under its terms, a 
Charter obligation will prevail over any conflicting obligation. That does 
not mean that the conflicting norm is invalidated, as with conflicts 
involving norms of jus cogens. The conflicting norm remains valid and 
continues to exist, albeit in suspended animation – the state is merely 
prohibited from following it.34 Secondly, though other prospective conflict 
clauses can be extinguished simply by the fact that all of the contracting 
parties to the treaty conclude another treaty, “an agreement concluded by 
some or even all UN members, without amending Article 103, would not 
prevail over the UN Charter.”35 Indeed, Article 30(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties explicitly subjects the application of the 
lex posterior rule to Article 103 of the Charter. Finally, Article 103 is not a 
 
 32. See id. para. 328. 
 33. See PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 277. 
 34. See ILC Study, supra note 1, paras. 333-34. See also Rain Liivoja, The Scope of the 
Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 583, 597 (2008) (arguing that 
“Charter-based obligations simply take precedence over other treaties, should conflicts arise.”). 
 35. PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 339. 
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simple rule of priority – it also precludes or removes any wrongfulness due 
to the breach of the conflicting norm.36 In other words, a state cannot be 
called to account for complying with its obligations under the Charter, even 
if in doing so it must violate some other rule – any rule, that is, except a 
rule of jus cogens.37 
Let us illustrate this through an example. States A, B and C conclude a 
treaty of friendship, whereby they agree to freely trade with one another, 
and undertake not to conclude any other agreements that would violate this 
commitment. After some time, states A and B become disaffected with the 
treaty and conclude a new trade agreement leaving out state C in 
contravention of the earlier treaty. This new inter se agreement is thus 
“illegal” under the terms of the previous treaty. Even so, both treaties have 
equal binding force, and states A and B will incur responsibility for 
breaching either of them. 
If, however, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, determines that state C is engaged in a threat to or a breach of 
international peace and security, and orders states A and B to implement 
trade sanctions against state C, they would be obliged to do so 
notwithstanding their earlier trade agreement. They would incur no 
responsibility for failing to comply with that agreement, as Article 103 of 
the Charter would preclude any wrongfulness of their actions under the 
treaty.  
 Even though Article 103 of the Charter is, strictly speaking, not a rule 
of hierarchy, such as jus cogens, since it does not result in the invalidation 
of a conflicting lower norm, it still largely resembles such a rule. Many 
authors consequently see in Article 103 a confirmation of the constitutional 
character of the Charter as the founding instrument of the post-Second 
World War international legal order.38 This is the first of several 
constitutionalist agendas that we will encounter. 
It should also be noted that Article 103 does not merely say that the 
Charter itself will prevail over conflicting obligations, but that member 
 
 36. There is no provision in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility that explicitly gives such 
preclusive effect to Article 103. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, pt.4, art. 59 cmt. 1, U.N. Doc A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf [hereinafter ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility]. However, Article 59 of the ILC Articles provides that they are without 
prejudice to the UN Charter. Id. at art. 59. The ILC commentary to this article makes it clear that this 
provision was inserted precisely to cover Article 103. Id. at Annex, pt.4, art. 59 cmt. 1. 
 37. See ILC Study, supra note 1, paras. 333-40. 
 38. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Article 103, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS – A 
COMMENTARY 1292 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002); Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as 
Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1998). 
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states’ obligations under the Charter will so prevail. This formulation is 
broader, as it encompasses state obligations arising from binding decisions 
of UN organs, primarily the Security Council, pursuant to Article 25 of the 
Charter, as in the example given above.39 That the primacy effect of Article 
103 also extends to binding Security Council resolutions has been 
confirmed by both doctrine and practice,40 as well as by the ICJ in the 
Lockerbie case.41 
Two further questions become apparent upon reading Article 103. 
First, by its own terms it applies only to a conflict with a Charter 
obligation. However, in practice the Security Council often authorizes 
states to do something in a legally binding resolution, for example to use 
force, but does not oblige them to do so. Second, Article 103 states only 
that Charter obligations prevail over conflicting obligations under any other 
‘international agreement’, such as a treaty. Hence the question arises 
whether Charter obligations also prevail over states’ conflicting customary 
or other non-treaty legal obligations. 
Doctrine has overwhelmingly answered both of these questions in the 
affirmative, in both cases on policy grounds and without much textual 
support in the Charter.42 Because authorizations by the Council to member 
states have effectively taken over the role of armed forces under UN 
command, as was originally envisaged in the Charter, and thus have a 
central place in the system of collective security,43 Article 103 has 
generally been interpreted to extend to Council authorizations as well as to 
its commands.44 Moreover, since obligations under a customary rule 
frequently run in parallel with treaty obligations that have the same 
 
 39. See Liivoja, supra note 34, at 585-89. 
 40. See ILC Study, supra note 1, para. 331. 
 41. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), para. 37 (Req. for Provisional Measures) (Order of Apr. 
14, 1992), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/88/7085.pdf. 
 42. See DAN SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS 150-51 
(1999); Jochen Frowein & Nico Krisch, Article 39, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS – A 
COMMENTARY 717, at MN 33 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002); Robert Kolb, Does Article 103 of the Charter 
of the United Nations Apply only to Decisions or also to Authorizations Adopted by the Security 
Council?, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [ZAÖRV] 
21 (2004), available at http://www.zaoerv.de/64_2004/64_2004_1_a_21_36.pdf; Wood, First Lecture, 
supra note 4, paras. 51-57. 
 43. See generally ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL (2004); Niels Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN 
Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing”, 11 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 541 (2000). 
 44. See, e.g., ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 232-33 
(2007). 
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substantive content, it would run contrary to the object and purpose of 
Article 103 if it could only preclude a state’s responsibility for failing to 
abide by the treaty, and not by the identical customary rule.45 
With these preliminary remarks on Article 103 out of the way, we now 
turn to examining the actual cases in which it played a key role. In both Al-
Jedda before the House of Lords46 and Behrami and Saramati before the 
European Court of Human Rights47 a grant of authority from the Council to 
certain member states was interpreted by these states as inter alia allowing 
them to engage in preventative detention without judicial review, in Iraq 
and Kosovo respectively. We will then move on to cases before EU courts 
that concern targeted sanctions by the Council against individuals 
suspected of financing terrorism. 
B. Al-Jedda and Behrami 
In June 2004 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1546 (2004), 
which was to provide the legal framework for the continued presence of the 
coalition or multi-national forces (MNF) in Iraq after the occupation of the 
country came to an end. In particular, the resolution independently granted 
these forces some of the rights that they enjoyed as occupiers under the law 
of armed conflict. The specific right that concerns us here is the occupier’s 
power to preventatively detain persons for security reasons, stipulated in 
Article 42(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention:48 “The internment or 
placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if 
the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary,” as well 
as in Article 78 thereof: “If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, 
for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning 
protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or 
to internment.”49 
 
 45. For dissenting views on Article 103’s applicability to customary norms, see Derek Bowett, 
The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement Procedures, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 89, 92 
(1994); Liivoja, supra note 34, at 602-12. 
 46. R (In re Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332 (appeal 
taken from Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2007/58.html. 
 47. Behrami and Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany, and Norway, App. Nos. 
71412/01, 78166/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2 May 2007), available through the HUDOC database at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 48. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 42, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 49. Id. art. 78. Article 43(1) further provides that “Any protected person who has been interned or 
placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an 
appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the 
internment or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or administrative board shall 
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Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council decided “that the 
multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures 
to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in 
accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing, inter 
alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational force 
and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism.”50 
The referenced letters were sent to the Council by the U.S. Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, and the then interim Prime Minister of Iraq Ayad 
Allawi. Both letters emphasized the ongoing security threats in Iraq and the 
need to put them to an end. In particular, Secretary Powell’s letter outlined 
the duties of the MNF forces, stating that these “will include combat 
operations against members of [insurgent] groups, internment where this is 
necessary for imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for 
and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security.”51 
Under this authority, in October 2004 British troops of the MNF 
detained Mr. Al-Jedda as a security threat.52 The detention was authorized 
and periodically reviewed by senior officers of the British army. Mr. Al-
Jedda challenged his detention before English courts, relying on Article 
5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR rights being 
transformed into English law by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA)), which enshrines the right to liberty of person and does not allow 
for internment on security grounds.53 The government opposed his 
 
periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the 
favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit.” Id. art. 43(1). 
 50. S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004) (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. at Annex (emphasis added). 
 52. R (In re Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, paras. 1-2, [2008] 1 A.C. 332 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/ 
2007/58.html. 
 53. Article 5(1) provides an exhaustive list of grounds on which a person may be deprived of his 
liberty: 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of 
a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an 
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an 
offence or fleeing 
after having done so; 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or 
his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal 
authority; 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; 
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challenge on two main grounds. First, it argued that in this particular 
situation the ECHR and the HRA did not apply extraterritorially. Second, 
even if they did, internment was authorized by a binding resolution of the 
Security Council, which prevailed over Article 5(1) under the terms of 
Article 103 of the Charter. The government desisted from its first argument 
after the House of Lords decided the Al-Skeini case, in which it established 
that the HRA and ECHR do apply to persons detained by British forces in 
Iraq.54 However, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, and 
ultimately the House of Lords found against Mr. Al-Jedda on the basis of 
Article 103. Let us now examine their Lordships’ ruling in detail. 
Lord Bingham, who delivered the lead opinion, first dealt with Mr. 
Al-Jedda’s argument that Article 103 was inapplicable, since Resolution 
1546 merely authorized the UK to detain persons considered to be security 
threats, but did not oblige it to do so. He did not find that argument 
persuasive. He considered that both state practice and academic opinion 
clearly favored the applicability of Article 103 to Council authorizations, as 
the importance of maintaining peace and security in the world could 
scarcely be exaggerated, and since authorizations have effectively replaced 
the system of collective security that was envisaged by the drafters.55 Lord 
Bingham then rejected the argument that Article 103 should not apply to 
the ECHR, due to the latter’s special character as a human rights treaty, as 
Article 103 applies to all international agreements.56 
For Lord Bingham, the conflict between two fundamental interests – 
that of protecting international peace and security on the one hand, and that 
of protecting human rights on the other, was truly acute, since it was 
difficult to see how any exercise of the power to detain preventatively, 
however necessary for imperative reasons of security, and however strong 
 
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised 
entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to 
deportation or extradition. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222. The drafters of the ECHR deliberately chose to include an exhaustive list of grounds 
for detention in Article 5(1), instead of a general standard, such as, for example, the one in Article 9(1) 
of the ICCPR which merely prohibits arbitrary detention, but does not specify what types of detention 
qualify as arbitrary. See Al-Jedda, [2007] UKHL 58, para. 122 (Baroness Hale, concurring). 
 54. R (Al-Skeini and others) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [2007] 3 WLR 33 (appeal 
taken from Eng.). For commentary on the decision, see Tobias Thienel, The ECHR in Iraq: The 
Judgment of the House of Lords in R (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 115 (2008). On the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, see generally Marko 
Milanović, From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human 
Rights Treaties, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 411 (2008); EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004). 
 55. Al-Jedda, [2007] UKHL 58 paras. 33-34. See also id. para. 115 (Lord Rodger, concurring). 
 56. Id. para. 35 (per Lord Bingham). 
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the safeguards afforded to the detainee, could do otherwise than breach the 
detainee’s rights under Article 5(1).57 
Lord Bingham thus concluded that there was a genuine norm conflict 
between a Charter obligation of the UK and Article 5(1) of the ECHR, and 
that the Charter obligation must prevail: 
Thus there is a clash between on the one hand a power or duty to detain 
exercisable on the express authority of the Security Council and, on the 
other, a fundamental human right which the UK has undertaken to secure 
to those (like the appellant) within its jurisdiction. How are these to be 
reconciled? There is in my opinion only one way in which they can be 
reconciled: by ruling that the UK may lawfully, where it is necessary for 
imperative reasons of security, exercise the power to detain authorised 
by UNSCR 1546 and successive resolutions, but must ensure that the 
detainee’s rights under article 5 are not infringed to any greater extent 
than is inherent in such detention.58 
Though Lord Bingham affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
on the issue of Article 103, his opinion introduces an element of subtlety 
lacking in that of the court below, evident in the somewhat cryptic 
italicized phrase in the quotation above. Yes, Mr. Al-Jedda cannot 
complain solely because his detention was on preventative grounds, but his 
rights must not be infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in such 
preventative detention. The exhaustive list of grounds of detention from 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR might have temporarily disappeared by virtue of 
Article 103 of the Charter, yet not only does a kernel of Article 5(1) remain 
in that the detention must not be unreasonable, but security detainees have 
other rights under Article 5 – to be informed of the reasons behind their 
arrest (Article 5(2)), to be able to challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention before a court (Article 5(4)) and to be compensated for any 
unlawful detention (Article 5(5)). Judicial review of detention in particular 
would be a major departure from the internment regime under the law of 
occupation, which allows for review by mere administrative boards.59 
This is of course all between the lines of Lord Bingham’s opinion – he 
says none of this explicitly, as the issue raised in the case was solely under 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR, not Article 5(4).60 But other Law Lords also 
gave similar hints. Thus, Baroness Hale remarked that 
 
 
 57. See id. para. 37. 
 58. Id. para. 39 (emphasis added). See also id. para. 118 (Lord Roger, concurring); id. paras. 125-
26 (Baroness Hale, concurring); id. para. 131 (Lord Carswell, concurring). 
 59. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra 
note 48, art. 43. 
 60. See also Al-Jedda, [2007] UKHL 58 para. 46 (Lord Rodger, concurring). 
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The right is qualified but not displaced. This is an important distinction, 
insufficiently explored in the all or nothing arguments with which we 
were presented. We can go no further than the UN has implicitly 
required us to go in restoring peace and security to a troubled land. The 
right is qualified only to the extent required or authorised by the 
resolution. What remains of it thereafter must be observed. This may 
have both substantive and procedural consequences.61 
Lord Carswell added that 
[W]here a state can lawfully intern people, it is important that it adopt 
certain safeguards: the compilation of intelligence about such persons 
which is as accurate and reliable as possible, the regular review of the 
continuing need to detain each person and a system whereby that need 
and the underlying evidence can be checked and challenged by 
representatives on behalf of the detained persons, so far as is practicable 
and consistent with the needs of national security and the safety of other 
persons.62 
. . . . 
I would emphasise, however, that that power [to detain] has to be 
exercised in such a way as to minimise the infringements of the 
detainee’s rights under article 5(1) of the Convention, in particular by 
adopting and operating to the fullest practicable extent safeguards of the 
nature of those to which I referred [to] above.63 
In Al-Jedda we can clearly see the presumption against norm conflict 
at work. Even though Resolution 1546 did prevail over Article 5(1) of the 
ECHR by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter, it did so only to the extent 
inherent in preventative detention. Even in cases of genuine norm conflict, 
especially those involving human rights, the scope of the conflict will be 
minimized through interpretation. Other methods of conflict resolution and 
avoidance could have been applied by the House in Al-Jedda, but they were 
either not relied on by the parties or were not to their Lordships’ liking. We 
will come to some of these below, but first we must turn to the Behrami 
and Saramati case before the European Court of Human Rights.64 This case 
was in effect Al-Jedda’s sibling, not only because they raised similar 
issues, but also as the litigation in the two cases ran in parallel: the lower 
courts in Al-Jedda ruled first, then the European Court decided Behrami, 
and finally the House of Lords delivered its own judgment in Al-Jedda. 
 
 61. Id. para. 126 (Baroness Hale, concurring). 
 62. Id. para. 130 (Lord Carswell, concurring). 
 63. Id. para. 136. 
 64. See also the later case of Berić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. Nos. 36357/04 (etc.), Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (16 October 2007), available through the HUDOC database at http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
echr/en/hudoc (relying on Behrami, a Chamber of the Court ruled that the acts of the international High 
Representative in Bosnia were attributable to the UN). 
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Behrami and Saramati were two joined cases filed against several 
states participating in KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in 
Kosovo.65 In Behrami, the applicants were the family of a boy who died 
while playing in an unmarked field saturated with undetonated cluster 
bombs. They alleged that the respondent state had the positive obligation to 
secure the right to life of the victim, which it failed to fulfill. The Saramati 
case is of more interest to our present discussion, as its facts closely follow 
Al-Jedda. The applicant was preventatively detained by the KFOR 
commander as a security threat to the international presence in Kosovo, 
without recourse to judicial review of his detention. KFOR based its power 
to detain on Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which authorized 
“Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the 
international security presence in Kosovo . . . with all necessary means to 
fulfill its responsibilities.”66 As in Al-Jedda, the applicant based his claim 
on Article 5 of the ECHR. 
The European Court’s approach to the case was completely different 
from that of the English courts in Al-Jedda. The Court said nary a word 
about norm conflict, and mentioned Article 103 of the Charter only in 
passing,67 even though it was extensively relied on by the respondent 
states.68 It disposed of the case on grounds of attribution, ruling that the 
impugned acts could not be attributed to the respondent states, but solely to 
the United Nations. It first reasoned that the Security Council was by 
Resolution 1244 “delegating to willing organisations and members 
states . . . the power to establish an international security presence as well 
as its operational command. Troops in that force would operate therefore 
on the basis of UN delegated, and not direct, command.”69 That notion of 
delegation would prove to be crucial in the Court’s attribution analysis: 
While Chapter VII constituted the foundation for the above-described 
delegation of UNSC security powers, that delegation must be sufficiently 
limited so as to remain compatible with the degree of centralisation of 
UNSC collective security constitutionally necessary under the Charter 
and, more specifically, for the acts of the delegate entity to be 
attributable to the UN.70 
 
 65. For a discussion of these cases, see Pierre Bodeau-Livinec et al., 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 323 
(2008). 
 66. S.C. Res. 1244, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
 67. See Behrami and Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany, and Norway, App. Nos. 
71412/01, 78166/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 26, 147 (2 May 2007), available through the HUDOC 
database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 68. See id. paras. 97, 102, 106, 113. 
 69. Id. para. 129. 
 70. Id. para. 132. 
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Hence, in the Court’s view, attribution depended upon “whether the 
UNSC retained ultimate authority and control so that operational command 
only was delegated.”71 After examining the conditions it thought necessary 
for a lawful delegation of the Council’s power the Court found this test to 
be met, 72 and concluded that KFOR “was exercising lawfully delegated 
Chapter VII powers of the UNSC so that the impugned action was, in 
principle, “attributable” to the UN.”73 Since the violations in question were 
not attributable to the respondent states, but to the UN, which is not itself a 
party to the ECHR, the Court found that the applications were incompatible 
with the Convention due to lack of jurisdiction ratione personae.74 
The attribution issue in Behrami was wrongly decided. A detailed 
account of why this is so is for elsewhere.75 For our present purposes, 
suffice it to say that the Court conflated two entirely separate questions – 
the delegation of powers by the Security Council and that of state 
responsibility. The Council may or may not have delegated some of its 
powers to KFOR, but it is its effective control over KFOR or, indeed, the 
lack thereof, that is dispositive for attribution.76 The Court, moreover, 
found some support for its attribution analysis solely in the work of a single 
author,77 and it failed to discuss or even acknowledge the otherwise 
unanimous contrary authorities, ranging from the legal opinions of the UN 
itself, to those of the ILC and of numerous scholars, to the effect that the 
UN cannot be responsible for the acts of troops over which it does not have 
operational control.78 Finally, the Court’s decision produces unacceptable 
results as a matter of policy, as it allows states to retain control over their 
 
 71. Id. para. 133. 
 72. Id. paras. 134-40. 
 73. Id. para. 141. 
 74. Id. paras. 144-52. 
 75. See Marko Milanović & Tatjana Papić, As Bad As It Gets: The European Court of Human 
Rights’ Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 267 
(2009). 
 76. See Int’l Law Comm’n Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-
Sixth Session, at 99, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/59/10, Draft Article 5 (2004). 
 77. See Milanović & Papić, supra note 75 (relying on Sarooshi, supra note 42, at 163-66). 
 78. See, e.g., European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion 
on Human Rights in Kosovo: Possible establishment of review mechanisms, 60th Sess., Doc. No. 280, at 
18 (2004), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL-AD(2004)033-e.pdf; Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by the United Nations and Other 
International Actors, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B.U.N. L. 649, 690 (2005); Andreas Paulus, Article 29, in 1 
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS – A COMMENTARY 539, at MN 9 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002); 
Jochen Frowein & Nico Krisch, Article 42, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS – A 
COMMENTARY 749, at MN 759 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002); C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 403 (2005); John Cerone, Minding the Gap: 
Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 469, 486 (2001). 
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armed forces in peacekeeping operations instead of putting them at the 
disposal of the UN, and at the same time allows them to blame the UN for 
any of their actions.79 
There can thus be little doubt that the Court’s attribution reasoning in 
Behrami is untenable.80 Yet, how can we explain the very obviousness of 
the flaws in the Court’s decision? In my view there is at least one possible 
explanation – what the Court said in its decision is conditioned above all by 
the things that it did not want to say. The issue that it wanted to avoid the 
most was precisely that of norm conflict and the preemptive effect of 
Article 103 of the Charter. It did not, it would not, say that Resolution 1244 
prevailed over Article 5 of the ECHR, as the English courts did in Al-
Jedda. For the European Court, the ECHR is the “constitutional instrument 
of European public order,”81 of which the Court itself is the ultimate 
guardian. Accepting in Behrami that fifteen states sitting in the Security 
Council could whisk away this “constitutional instrument” on the basis of 
Article 103 would have created a precedent capable of abuse in a not-so-
distant future. On the other hand, the Court also did not want to openly 
defy the Council or interfere with the Chapter VII system and peacekeeping 
operations such as Kosovo – sympathize with the applicants it might, but 
rule in their favor it would not. And so the Court came up with its strained 
attribution to the UN rationale, which solved its immediate problems. It not 
only avoided a norm conflict, but also what the Court saw as a conflict of 
constitutional importance. 
C. Kadi and OMPI 
I now turn to the Court of First Instance of the European Communities 
(CFI), which decided several cases on sanctions imposed by the Security 
 
 79. The issue of attribution was also raised in Al-Jedda before the House of Lords, after Behrami 
was decided. The House refused to follow Behrami, inter alia because it would produce simply absurd 
consequences in the Iraq context, as it would for example be the UN, instead of the U.S., who would 
bear responsibility for the Abu Ghraib torture scandal. The House managed to avoid relying on Behrami 
not by holding that it was wrongly decided, but by (not entirely persuasively) distinguishing it on the 
facts. See also Milanović & Papić, supra note 75. 
 80. See also Bodeau-Livinec et al., supra note 65, at 325-31; Aurel Sari, Jurisdiction and 
International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases, 8 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 51, 162-65 (2008); Bernhard Knoll, Rights Without Remedies: The European Court’s 
Failure to Close the Human Rights Gap in Kosovo, 68 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES 
ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [ZAÖRV]; Kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen, Attribution of 
Conduct in Peace Operations: The ‘Ultimate Authority and Control’ Test, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 509, 520-
25 (2008). 
 81. Behrami and Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany, and Norway, App. Nos. 
71412/01, 78166/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2 May 2007), available through the HUDOC database at http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
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Council against suspected terrorists and their supporters. The cases are 
highly complex, and I will only deal with issues of norm conflict that 
appear therein. The first to be examined are Yusuf and Kadi.82 As the two 
cases are nearly identical, Kadi will be the one referred to throughout the 
article. In the background of the case are the sanctions originally 
established by the Security Council in its Resolution 1267 (1999) against 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The sanctions regime was expanded by 
subsequent resolutions to the Al-Qaeda network and persons associated 
with it.83 The Council set up a Sanctions Committee as its subsidiary body 
to monitor the implementation of sanctions, which maintained lists of 
suspected terrorists. UN member states were obliged to enforce sanctions 
against these listed individuals. 
Having this sanctions regime in view, the member states of the 
European Union (EU)84 decided that instead of implementing this regime 
individually in their respective domestic legal systems, they should do so 
through EU mechanisms. The EU Council thus adopted several common 
positions, as well as Regulation No. 881/2002, implementing the sanctions 
regime. Annexed to the Regulation was the list of persons whose funds 
were to be frozen, on the basis of the lists made by the Sanctions 
Committee of the Security Council. As Community law, the Regulation 
had direct effect in the legal orders of the member states and took 
precedence over any contrary domestic legislation. 
The assets of the applicant in Kadi were frozen in this manner. He 
complained to the CFI, seeking to annul the implementing Regulation on 
the grounds that it violated his fundamental human rights as protected by 
primary EU law (that, under long-standing jurisprudence, protects as 
general principles a corpus of fundamental rights, including the rights 
enshrined in the ECHR), including the right to a fair hearing, the right to 
property and the right to judicial review.85 One of his key arguments was 
that 
[T]he Security Council resolutions relied on by the [EU] Council and the 
Commission do not confer on those institutions the power to abrogate 
those fundamental rights without justifying that stance before the Court 
by producing the necessary evidence. As a legal order independent of the 
United Nations, governed by its own rules of law, the European Union 
 
 82. Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-
3533; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649. 
 83. See generally Chia Lehnardt, European Court Rules on UN and EU Terrorist Suspect 
Blacklists, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L INSIGHTS, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.asil.org/insights070131.cfm. 
 84. Purely as a matter of convenience, the terms European Union and European Community (EC) 
will be used interchangeably throughout this paper, as will EU law, EC law and Community law. 
 85. Kadi, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649. para. 59. 
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must justify its actions by reference to its own powers and duties vis-à-
vis individuals within that order.86 
The import of this argument cannot be overemphasized, as it 
challenges the most fundamental operating assumption of Article 103 of 
the Charter. Like any rule of hierarchy (or something closely resembling 
one), it can only prevail over a norm which is a part of the same legal 
order. As the United States Constitution is the supreme law only in the 
United States legal system, but not in the legal orders of France or China, 
so is Article 103 of the Charter superior law only in the international legal 
system. According to Kadi’s argument, however, he was entitled to human 
rights protections under EU law, and that legal order “was independent of 
the United Nations.” The Security Council resolution could not prevail over 
these rights, as it could not penetrate this independent legal order. This, as 
we shall see, was one of the main themes of the Advocate-General’s 
opinion in Kadi, as wells as the decision on appeal of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), to which we will turn shortly. 
On the other hand, the EU Council and Commission submitted 
[F]irst, that the Community, like the Member States of the United 
Nations, is bound by international law to give effect, within its spheres of 
competence, to resolutions of the Security Council, especially those 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; second, 
that the powers of the Community institutions in this area are limited and 
that they have no autonomous discretion in any form; third, that they 
cannot therefore alter the content of those resolutions or set up 
mechanisms capable of giving rise to any alteration in their content and, 
fourth, that any other international agreement or domestic rule of law 
liable to hinder such implementation must be disregarded. 
. . . 
[A]s members of the United Nations, the Member States of the 
Community have agreed to carry out without reservation the decisions 
taken in their name by the Security Council, in the higher interest of the 
maintenance of international peace and security (see Articles 24(1) and 
25 of the Charter of the United Nations). The obligations imposed on a 
Member of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations prevail over every other international obligation to which 
the member might be subject. In that way Article 103 of the Charter 
makes it possible to disregard any other provision of international law, 
whether customary or laid down by convention, in order to apply the 
resolutions of the Security Council, thus creating an ‘effect of legality’.87 
 
 86. Id. para. 140. 
 87. Id. paras. 153, 156. 
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Hence, the parties put before the CFI a much more fundamental 
question than the resolution of a single norm conflict – that of the 
relationship between general international law and EU law.88 Only if the 
Court found that the two legal orders were one, even though to a great 
extent autonomous, could it entertain the Article 103 argument. It went on 
to do just that. First, it held that 
From the standpoint of international law, the obligations of the Member 
States of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations 
clearly prevail over every other obligation of domestic law or of 
international treaty law including, for those of them that are members of 
the Council of Europe, their obligations under the ECHR and, for those 
that are also members of the Community, their obligations under the EC 
Treaty. 
. . . 
With more particular regard to the relations between the obligations of 
the Member States of the Community by virtue of the Charter of the 
United Nations and their obligations under Community law, it may be 
added that, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 307 EC, 
‘The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, 
between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more 
third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this 
Treaty.’89 
Furthermore, 
Article 224 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (now Article 297 EC) was specifically introduced into the 
Treaty in order to observe the rule of primacy defined above. Under that 
provision, “Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking 
together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the common 
market being affected by measures which a Member State may be called 
upon to take . . . in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the 
purpose of maintaining peace and international security.”90 
The Court thus held that 
[P]ursuant both to the rules of general international law and to the 
specific provisions of the Treaty, Member States may, and indeed must, 
leave unapplied any provision of Community law, whether a provision of 
primary law or a general principle of that law, that raises any 
impediment to the proper performance of their obligations under the 
Charter of the United Nations.91 
 
 88. Id. para. 178. 
 89. Id. paras. 181, 185. 
 90. Id. para. 188. 
 91. Id. para. 190. 
MILANOVIC_FMT1A.DOC 11/20/2009  11:22:39 AM 
90 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:69 
Moreover, 
unlike its Member States, the Community as such is not directly bound 
by the Charter of the United Nations and that it is not therefore required, 
as an obligation of general public international law, to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 
of that Charter. The reason is that the Community is not a member of the 
United Nations, or an addressee of the resolutions of the Security 
Council, or the successor to the rights and obligations of the Member 
States for the purposes of public international law. Nevertheless, the 
Community must be considered to be bound by the obligations under the 
Charter of the United Nations in the same way as its Member States, by 
virtue of the Treaty establishing it. In that regard, it is not in dispute that 
at the time when they concluded the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community the Member States were bound by their 
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. By concluding a 
treaty between them they could not transfer to the Community more 
powers than they possessed or withdraw from their obligations to third 
countries under that Charter.92 
The Court thus rejected the applicant’s argument that “the Community 
legal order is a legal order independent of the United Nations, governed by 
its own rules of law.”93 
The Court then proceeded to examine the lawfulness of the contested 
Regulation. It found that the Regulation was merely implementing Security 
Council resolutions, and that neither the member states nor the EU 
institutions had any autonomous discretion in that regard. In particular, 
they could neither directly alter the content of the resolutions at issue nor 
set up any mechanism capable of giving rise to such alteration.94 If the 
Court were to review and annul the Regulation as violative of human 
rights, this would necessarily mean that resolutions that the Regulation was 
implementing were so violative. The Court would thus be exercising 
indirect review of a Security Council decision, a competence that both 
member states and EU institutions denied it had.95 
The Court agreed that it lacked such competence, with the proviso that 
it could indirectly review “the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security 
Council in question with regard to jus cogens, understood as a body of 
higher rules of public international law binding on all subjects of 
international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and from 
which no derogation is possible.”96 If the Council’s resolutions failed to 
 
 92. Id. paras. 192-95 (breaks and citations omitted). 
 93. Id. para. 208. 
 94. Id. paras. 213-14. 
 95. Id. paras. 216-17. 
 96. Id. para. 226. 
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observe norms of jus cogens, however improbable that may be, “they 
would bind neither the Member States of the United Nations nor, in 
consequence, the Community.”97 
The Court then proceeded to conduct this limited form of review, 
which unsurprisingly ended up being deferential to the Security Council. 
The Court – with very little support – gave a very broad reading to jus 
cogens and considered that human rights such as the right to property or the 
right of access to a court fall within that category. Nonetheless, the 
limitations on the applicant’s rights were justified, as they were inherent in 
the rights themselves as guaranteed by jus cogens. If anything, the 
judgment demonstrates the limited utility of jus cogens as a mechanism for 
conflict resolution, even in instances in which a court is prepared to broadly 
construe this body of norms.98 
The challenge to the listing procedure failed in Kadi, but met with 
more success in Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. 
Council (OMPI).99 In this case, at issue was not the listing process 
established under Resolution 1267, in which the Sanctions Committee drew 
up the lists of persons whose assets were to be frozen, but the process under 
Resolution 1373 (2001), which obliges member states to freeze assets and 
take various other measures in combating terrorism. This resolution, 
however, leaves discretion to the member states on how to designate 
persons for these sanctions and what kind of procedures to follow. The EU 
institutions passed Regulation No. 2580/2001 to implement Resolution 
1373, and gave the EU Council the authority to maintain the lists of 
persons to whom the prescribed sanctions will be applied. 
The difference between the two listing procedures proved to be crucial 
for the CFI: 
It is, moreover, appropriate to mention the aspects which distinguish the 
present case from the cases which gave rise to the judgments in Yusuf 
and Kadi . . . where it was held that the Community institutions were not 
required to hear the parties concerned in the context of the adoption and 
implementation of a similar measure freezing the funds of persons and 
entities linked to Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taleban. 
That solution was justified in those cases by the fact that the Community 
institutions had merely transposed into the Community legal order, as 
they were required to do, resolutions of the Security Council and 
decisions of its Sanctions Committee that imposed the freezing of the 
funds of the parties concerned, designated by name, without in any way 
 
 97. Id. para. 230. 
 98. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 99. Case T-228/02, Org. des Modjahedines du people d’Iran v. Council of the European Union, 
2006 E.C.R. II-4665 [hereinafter OMPI]. 
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authorising those institutions, at the time of actual implementation, to 
provide for any Community mechanism whatsoever for the examination 
or re-examination of individual situations.100 
In this case, by contrast, it was upon the Community to identify 
specifically the persons to whom the sanctions will apply, in accordance 
with the rules of its own legal order.101 The Court concluded that 
[T]he Council maintained at the hearing that, in the implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), the measures that it adopted 
under circumscribed powers, which thereby benefit from the principle of 
primacy as contemplated in Articles 25 and 103 of the United Nations 
Charter, are essentially those provided for by the relevant provisions of 
Regulation No. 2580/2001, which determine the content of the restrictive 
measures to be adopted in relation to the persons referred to in Paragraph 
1(c) of that resolution. However, unlike the acts at issue in the cases 
which gave rise to the judgments in Yusuf and Kadi . . . the acts which 
specifically apply those restrictive measures to a given person or entity, 
such as the contested decision, do not come within the exercise of 
circumscribed powers and accordingly do not benefit from the primacy 
effect in question.102 
Thus, in the Court’s view, when EU institutions exercise their 
discretion in designating persons to be subjected to sanctions, they must do 
so in accordance with established principles of EU law safeguarding 
fundamental rights. Inter alia, they must state the reasons for sanctions to 
persons targeted, and must provide them with a meaningful and fair hearing 
to contest their designation. As the decision at hand did not provide these 
safeguards, it had to be annulled.103 In terms of our discussion on norm 
conflict, the Court was saying that not even an apparent conflict existed. 
There was no contradiction in requiring EU institutions to provide reasons 
for a listing and an opportunity to challenge it and the provisions of 
Resolution 1373. 
D. Specific Methods of Avoidance and Resolution 
The cases presented above either employ or hint at several methods of 
norm conflict avoidance and resolution in addition to Article 103 of the 
Charter. As with jus cogens, Article 103 creates incentives for courts to 
avoid norm conflicts, and even reliance on Article 103 itself, when they 
can, especially when “constitutional” values are implicated, such as the 
protection of human rights. Even when a genuine conflict truly exists, as in 
 
 100. Id. paras. 99-100. 
 101. Id. paras. 101-102. 
 102. Id. para. 103. 
 103. Id. paras. 160-74. 
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Al-Jedda, courts will attempt to minimize its impact through interpretative 
means. 
In Kadi, we witnessed both the application of Article 103 and what 
can be termed the testing of the external validity of a Security Council 
resolution, i.e., the review of its compatibility with the one body of 
international law that the Council cannot override, jus cogens. Surely there 
is no great controversy in saying that a Security Council resolution ordering 
states to torture suspected terrorists would be void due to a conflict with a 
peremptory norm. But the Security Council would never adopt such a 
resolution. States can be subtle, even if, or particularly if they wish to limit 
the rights of individuals, and the likelihood of states openly adopting norms 
contrary to jus cogens is nil. We thus learned in Kadi that such review of 
external validity as exercised by the CFI is of little practical use, as the 
Council resolution will survive this review even when the court (wrongly) 
reads the content of jus cogens expansively.104 Or, if we take Al-Jedda as 
an example, if the House wished to review the external validity of 
Resolution 1546,105 it could have come to no other conclusion than that the 
resolution was valid, since the prohibition of preventative detention 
certainly does not qualify as jus cogens, if for no other fact than that 
internment is expressly allowed in armed conflict.106 It is only if the 
concept of jus cogens is read so expansively that it is stretched to breaking 
point that it could be used to invalidate a Security Council resolution. In 
my view, this neither should nor is likely to happen.107 
Yet, there is no cogent legal reason to test Security Council decisions 
solely on their external validity. The Council is not a global sovereign, a 
prince who is legibus solutus. It is an organ of an international organization 
and its powers are necessarily limited by that organization’s constitutive 
 
 104. As ICJ President Higgins recently stated in relation to jus cogens, “[t]he examples [of such 
norms] are likely, in my view, to be very, very few in number.” Rosalyn Higgins, A Babel of Judicial 
Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, 55 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 791, 801 (2006). For a much more 
expansive take on the role of jus cogens in limiting the Security Council, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, 
The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 59 (2005). 
 105. Lord Bingham did indeed briefly mention that Security Council resolutions could not override 
rules of jus cogens – see R (Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, para. 35, 12 
December 2007, available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2007/58.html 
 106. See also Sir Michael Wood, Second Lecture: The Security Council’s Powers and their Limits, 
Lauterpacht Lectures, University of Cambridge, para. 50, Nov. 8, 2006, available at http:// 
www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/2006_hersch_lecture_2.pdf. 
 107. As one author put it, “one of the major threats posed to the concept of jus cogens is the 
tendency by some of its most fervent supporters to see it everywhere.” Bianchi, supra note 11, at 506. 
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instrument, the Charter.108 That treaty cannot be plausibly interpreted as 
granting the Council the power to do whatever it wishes.109 There can be no 
doubt that, as a matter of substantive law, an ultra vires decision of the 
Council which is contrary to the Charter has no binding force.110 
Thus, the internal validity of a Council resolution against the Charter 
can also be tested. When it comes to human rights in particular, a 
persuasive argument can be made that the Council is Charter-bound to 
conform to certain human rights norms, not limited just to the norms of jus 
cogens. A textual argument would be that Article 24(2) of the Charter 
requires the Council to act “in accordance with the Purposes and Principles 
of the United Nations,” while Article 1(3) provides for “promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” as one of the 
purposes of the UN.111 
The lack of a principled reason for rejecting review of the internal 
validity of Council decisions does not mean that there are no practical 
difficulties in doing so. First, the Charter does not specify in any way the 
human rights that could serve as a check on the Council’s power.112 
Secondly, any review of a Council decision, especially in the context of 
Chapter VII, would have to be deferential, both as to the Council’s 
determination that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression exist, and as to what measures are appropriate to deal with this 
situation. Finally, and most importantly, the main problem is not with the 
substantive position that an ultra vires resolution of the Council is invalid, 
but with the claim of authority to exercise judicial review. In other words, 
 
 108. See Bowett, supra note 45, at 92-93 (“[T]he Council decisions are binding only in so far as 
they are in accordance with the Charter.”). 
 109. See David Feldman, The Role of Constitutional Principles in Protecting International Peace 
and Security through International, Supranational and National Legal Institutions, 6 N.Z. J. PUB. & 
INT'L L. 1, 9 (2008) (“Even if one regards state sovereignty as being at the heart of the powers of 
international organisations, there is no reason to assume that a state would consent to an organisation 
exercising a power so as to compromise the interests of that state or the rights of its nationals and 
residents if the exercise of the power goes beyond a reasonable reading of the scope of the power. It 
should therefore be possible to explore the limits to the powers of the UN Security Council by applying 
ordinary legal principles to establish the scope of the authority conferred by an international instrument 
such as the UN Charter.”). 
 110. See ILC Study, supra note 1, para. 331 (“Since obligations for Member States of the United 
Nations can only derive out of such resolutions that are taken within the limits of its powers, decisions 
ultra vires do not give rise to any obligations to begin with.”). 
 111. See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 44, at 230; Dapo Akande, The International Court of 
Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political 
Organs of the United Nations?, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 309, 316-17 (1997). 
 112. See Jared Schott, Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative Ideal 
of Emergency, 6 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 24, 119-22 (2007). 
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the fundamental question is who will be the judge of whether a Security 
Council resolution is in accordance with the Charter.113 The Charter itself 
does not say that the ICJ or any other court, international or domestic, has 
the power to do so. On the other hand, the Charter does not say either that 
the Security Council only and exclusively will be the judge of its own 
powers. Though Council resolutions cannot be subjected as such to a 
specific action for annulment, they could still be challenged incidentally, if 
they are invoked in other judicial proceedings. 
This dilemma is of course familiar to any student of constitutionalism. 
The United States Supreme Court, for example, was faced with the exact 
same question in Marbury v. Madison.114 The Court there asserted its 
power to review the constitutionality of the acts of the other branches of the 
U.S. government, without any explicit basis in the Constitution’s text. That 
does not mean that the mere assertion of such a power by the Court was 
enough to actually establish it – what truly mattered was that this claim to 
authority was accepted by the other actors concerned, and gradually 
became an entrenched and uncontested (if not uncontroversial) feature of 
the system. 
The same could eventually happen in the international system, yet that 
is by no means a certainty. The ICJ or some other court might assert its 
authority to decide on the validity of Security Council resolution, but that 
does not mean that this claim will be accepted by states and by the Council. 
So far, the ICJ in particular has refrained from attempting such a Marbury 
moment.115 In two cases – Lockerbie and Genocide – the parties’ arguments 
presented it with an opportunity to review a Security Council resolution. In 
both cases the Court gave this opportunity a pass,116 though in their 
individual opinions some judges expressed their views both for and against 
judicial review.117 The closest we have come to Marbury before any 
international court was in the Tadić case118 before the Appeals Chamber of 
 
 113. See generally Thomas M. Franck, The “Powers of Appreciation”: Who Is the Ultimate 
Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 519 (1992); Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security 
Council, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1996). 
 114. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 115. See Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331, 353-54 
(2008). 
 116. See generally Bernd Martenczuk, The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial 
Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 517, 521-22 (1999); Alvarez, supra note 
113, at n.1. 
 117. See Lockerbie, supra note 41, 1998 I.C.J. 27 (Judgment of Feb. 27); Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & 
Mont.), 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Order of Apr. 8); 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Order of Sept. 13). 
 118. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995). 
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the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
established by a Chapter VII resolution of the Security Council. In that 
case, the first decided by the ICTY, the defendant challenged the Tribunal’s 
legality, claiming that the Council did not have the legal power to establish 
a judicial body. The Trial Chamber held that it did not have jurisdiction to 
pronounce on the legality of the ICTY’s establishment, as it could not 
review a decision of the Council.119 The Appeals Chamber, on the other 
hand, ruled that as a part of its inherent compétence de la compétence it did 
have the power to enquire about its own legality, and (unsurprisingly) 
found that the Council did indeed have the authority under the Charter to 
establish the ICTY.120 
Yet, Tadić did not provoke a Marbury moment. The Appeals Chamber 
was dealing with a very specific issue, a challenge to its own legality. No 
other court so far has reviewed the internal validity of any Council 
resolution. Though Tadić remains an important precedent, whether it will 
be followed remains to be seen. Courts will generally find arguments based 
on the internal validity of a resolution unattractive, and that especially goes 
for domestic courts. To take Al-Jedda as an example, if the appellants had 
actually made such an argument and contested the validity of Resolution 
1546, it would still have been most unlikely for national judges to become 
the avant-garde of international law by assuming for themselves the power 
to review Chapter VII decisions of the Security Council. Moreover, it 
should also be noted the review of Council resolutions by domestic, as 
opposed to international courts, would in essence amount to the review of 
UN acts by its individual member states. Though in principle 
unobjectionable, this could still in practical terms potentially spell disaster 
for the system of collective security established by the Charter.121 
The possibility that courts will start reviewing decisions of the 
Council relatively soon is not to be excluded. The more the Council 
impinges on human rights and the more invasive it becomes, the greater the 
temptation for the courts will be.122 Yet, even if a court was willing to 
entertain a challenge to the external or internal validity of a Council 
resolution it would be most unlikely that such a challenge would succeed, 
because of the very limited scope of jus cogens, the lack of specificity of 
 
 119. Id., Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction in the Trial Chamber of the International 
Tribunal, ¶ 5 (Aug. 10, 1995). 
 120. Id., Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 18-22. 
 121. See Wood, Second Lecture, supra note 106, para. 64. 
 122. In a similar vein, see Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s 
Anti-Terrorism Measures: The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 881, 912-14 
(2006). 
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human rights constraints on the Council in the Charter itself, and the large 
deference that would be due to the Council in any case involving the 
maintenance of international peace and security.123 
The review of external validity of Council resolution against jus 
cogens and the review of their internal validity vis-à-vis the Charter are at 
the same time tools of both conflict avoidance and of conflict resolution. 
An apparent conflict between a resolution and some other norm of 
international law is avoided, because a second conflict between the 
resolution and either the Charter or jus cogens is resolved in the latter’s 
favor. Now, however, it might be helpful to advance another interpretative 
mechanism of conflict avoidance. This mechanism has thus far not been 
explicitly used by courts, though this may change, since it provides more 
practical avenues for the effective protection of human rights than theories 
of judicial review. 
As we have seen above, some Security Council resolutions use 
exceptionally broad language. For example, Resolution 1546 at issue in Al-
Jedda gave the MNF “the authority to take all necessary measures to 
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq,” while 
Resolution 1244 at issue in Behrami and Saramati authorized “Member 
States and relevant international organizations to establish the international 
security presence in Kosovo . . . with all necessary means to fulfill its 
responsibilities.” Should Article 103 of the Charter truly apply to these 
kinds of vague phrases, with the effect of prevailing over contrary treaties 
and denying individuals some of their basic rights? Should open language 
such as “all necessary measures” and “all necessary means” be read as 
encompassing everything and anything that the authorized states might 
want – say preventative detention without recourse to judicial review – thus 
trumping the very clear and detailed provisions of human rights treaties, 
like Article 5(1) of the ECHR? Surely not. It is one thing to say that the 
phrase “all necessary means” has in practice developed as the appropriate 
diplomatic euphemism for the use of military force, but it cannot be 
plausibly read as an absolution from all human rights constraints that do 
not qualify as jus cogens.124 The Charter may give the Council the power to 
override legally valid treaties, and even custom, but this power is by 
definition exceptional. If, in other words, the Council truly wishes to 
derogate from otherwise applicable human rights guarantees, it must do so 
 
 123. See also Wood, Second Lecture, supra note 106, para. 6 (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of 
circumstances arising in practice that could raise serious doubts about the legality of the Council’s 
actions.”). But see Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the 
United Nations, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 593, 607 (2003) (arguing that Resolution 1373 is ultra vires). 
 124. See Liivoja, supra note 34, at 589. 
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clearly and explicitly, and it and its members must consequently bear the 
political responsibility for such an action. 
What I am advocating, therefore, is for the creation of a rebuttable 
interpretative presumption supported by a clear statement rule – Security 
Council resolutions should be interpreted as far as possible to be 
compatible with human rights, as well as with other rules of general 
international law, in the absence of a clear statement by the Council to the 
contrary. Such a presumption is warranted by several considerations of 
policy and principle. First, and most generally, by the presumption against 
norm conflict in international law.125 Second, by the indisputable fact that 
the Security Council was not created as a global legislator,126 a quick and 
dirty substitute for the ordinary international law-making process via treaty 
or custom.127 It is a body with the singular and extremely important mission 
of safeguarding international peace and security, but despite its apparent 
omnipotence and the broad exercise of its powers, as for instance in the 
quasi-legislative Resolution 1373, its role is limited. The legally binding 
norms that it may create and to which the Charter grants priority are still 
conditioned upon that mission of maintenance of peace.128 Important as that 
mission undoubtedly is, it is not a license to the Council to ignore the rest 
of international law. 
Third, reading the Council’s resolutions so that they are compatible 
with states’ human rights obligations is consistent with the Council’s own 
statements on the matter. For example, in Resolution 1456 (2003), the 
Council, working at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, affirmed that 
“States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply 
with all their obligations under international law . . . in particular human 
rights, refugee, and humanitarian law[.]”129 The Council should not be 
taken to have departed from a commitment that it has promulgated without 
clear evidence to the contrary. 
 
 125. See generally PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 240-44. 
 126. See generally Michael Fremuth & Jörn Griebel, On the Security Council as a Legislator: A 
Blessing or a Curse for the International Community?, 76 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 339, 348-60 (2007); 
Björn Elberling, The Ultra Vires Character of Legislative Action by the Security Council, 2 INT’L ORG. 
L. REV. 337, 342-52 (2005). 
 127. See also Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing 
Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L. L. 275, 299-300 (2008); BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra 
note 44, at 115. 
 128. See also Wood, First Lecture, supra note 4, at paras 23-57. 
 129. S.C. Res 1456, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (January 20, 2003). 
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Fourth, as important as peace and security are,130 they are not a priori 
any more important than human rights, and vice versa. These rights are not 
gifts or privileges granted to individuals by generously disposed states, but 
rights which are inherent in the individuals’ own dignity as human beings 
that cannot easily be sacrificed at the altar of security by overly eager 
states. 
Finally, states to which an authority is given by the Council will 
naturally tend to interpret that authority broadly, as is the case with 
preventative detention. There is no indication, for example, that the Council 
truly wished to authorize unreviewable military detentions in Kosovo by 
Resolution 1244, as was argued by KFOR member states. A presumption 
can help curtail this tendency, though it cannot eliminate it altogether. 
Interpretative presumptions of this sort are ubiquitous in domestic law 
and they have a pride of place in the human rights sphere. Perhaps the best 
examples can be had in the public law of the United Kingdom. Not only is 
a presumption favoring compatibility of legislation with human rights now 
laid down by statute, in Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998,131 but 
courts have for constitutional reasons applied such presumptions 
independently of the HRA and the ECHR. As Lord Hoffmann put it, 
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, 
legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights. The Human 
Rights Act 1998 will not detract from this power. The constraints upon 
its exercise by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But the 
principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what 
it is doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be 
overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too 
great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may 
have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of 
express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts 
therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be 
subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the 
United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, 
apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which 
exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited 
by a constitutional document.132 
 
 130. See, e.g., Behrami and Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany, and Norway, App. 
Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 148-49 (2 May 2007), available through the HUDOC 
database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (affirming “imperative” aim of the UN of 
safeguarding international peace and security). 
 131. On the strength of which see Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] 2 A.C. 557, paras 42–50 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
 132. R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, ex parte Simms and Another, [2000] 2 A.C. 115, 131 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (per Lord Hoffmann). 
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Note that it has been an axiomatic assumption of English 
constitutional law that Parliament is sovereign and capable of doing as it 
pleases with human rights,133 but that the interpretative presumption exists 
notwithstanding Parliamentary sovereignty.134 All the more reason to apply 
such a presumption to the Security Council, which is most certainly not a 
sovereign in the likeness of Parliament.135 
Likewise, the High Court of Australia, a country which has no written 
bill of rights, has held that 
The insistence on express authorisation of an abrogation or curtailment 
of a fundamental right, freedom or immunity must be understood as a 
requirement for some manifestation or indication that the legislature has 
not only directed its attention to the question of the abrogation or 
curtailment of such basic rights, freedoms or immunities but has also 
determined upon abrogation or curtailment of them. The courts should 
not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with fundamental 
rights. Such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakeable 
and unambiguous language. General words will rarely be sufficient for 
that purpose if they do not specifically deal with a question because, in 
the context in which they appear, they will often be ambiguous on the 
aspect of interference with fundamental rights.136 
Similarly, in the United States, the Supreme Court recently had the 
opportunity to decide on the habeas corpus rights of detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay. Inter alia, it invoked a clear statement rule, holding that 
“Congress should ‘not be presumed to have effected such denial [of habeas 
corpus relief] absent an unmistakably clear statement . . . to the 
contrary.’”137 
 
 133. See ALBERT DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
39-40 (1959) (“The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, 
namely, that Parliament . . . has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”) (footnote omitted). 
 134. See also R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Ex parte Pierson, [1998] A.C. 539, 575 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (“From these authorities, I think 
the following proposition is established. A power conferred by Parliament in general terms is not to be 
taken to authorise the doing of acts by the donee of the power which adversely affect the legal rights of 
the citizen or the basic principles on which the law of the United Kingdom is based unless the statute 
conferring the power makes it clear that such was the intention of Parliament.”). 
 135. But cf. Macarthys Ltd v. Smith, [1979] I.C.R. 785, 788-89 (explaining that the House of Lords 
likewise employs a clear statement rule in instances of apparent norm conflict between UK law and EU 
law, with priority being given to the latter in absence of an express statement of Parliament to the 
contrary.). 
 136. Coco v. The Queen (1994) 179 C.L.R. 427, 437 (Austl.) (footnote omitted). 
 137. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2243 (2008) (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 
575 (2006)); see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (narrowly interpreting a statute relied 
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The foregoing discussion should not be taken as a facile application of 
some domestic law analogy to international law. As well noted, such 
analogies can be “more misleading than enlightening.”138 In this case, 
however, the basic ideas are the same. A rebuttable interpretative 
presumption of this type can clearly be a useful method for avoiding 
conflicts of norms arising from competing (constitutional) considerations – 
the Charter and peace and security on the one hand, and human rights on 
the other.139 To take the facts of Behrami and Saramati as an example, it 
would have been much a better tool of avoidance for the European Court 
than its misguided theory of attribution. Why should, after all, the phrase 
“all necessary means” be read as authorizing preventative detention without 
any judicial review?140 
Al-Jedda, on the other hand, is more difficult. Though the Council 
again used vague language of authorization, it did tie it to the two letters 
annexed to Resolution 1546, which did expressly mention internment on 
security grounds. Thus it could be plausibly asserted that the presumption 
has been rebutted and that the clear statement rule is satisfied. On the other 
hand, as we have seen above, the House of Lords nonetheless narrowly 
interpreted this authorization, in essence reading it as dispensing solely 
with the exhaustive numeration of grounds of detention in Article 5(1) of 
the ECHR. Moreover, in her judgment Baroness Hale appeared more than a 
little troubled with any sort of broad reading of Council authorizations 
infringing on human rights: 
We have been concerned at a more abstract level with attribution to or 
authorisation by the United Nations. We have devoted little attention to 
the precise scope of the authorisation. There must still be room for 
argument about what precisely is covered by the resolution and whether 
it applies on the facts of this case. Quite how that is to be done remains 
for decision in the other proceedings.141 
 
on by the Executive to refuse issuing a passport to a suspected Communist, finding that Congress can 
curtail the constitutionally protected right to free movement only if its does so in explicit terms). 
 138. See Wood, Second Lecture, supra note 106, at para 58 (quoting Sir Elihu Lauterpacht). 
 139. See also Bianchi, supra note 122, at 916 (“[R]arely would one need to construe human rights 
obligations as conflicting with SC anti-terror measures. A presumption of consistency of the latter with 
human rights obligations, and -- one may add -- all the more so with regard to peremptory norms, seems 
a perfectly viable interpretive tool to guarantee the required degree of consistency of SC resolutions 
with the international legal order.”). 
 140. See also Feldman, supra note 109, at 9 (arguing that “[w]hen exercising functions that 
interfere with people’s rights, international institutions must expect that a strict interpretation will be 
applied to their powers.”). 
 141. R (In re Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, para 129, available at http:// 
www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2007/58.html. 
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In conclusion, a clear statement rule is not a magic bullet. It will not 
be able to avoid all situations of conflict – for instance, it would have been 
of little use in Kadi, where the Council made its intentions perfectly clear. 
It is, however, necessary for channeling through law the great powers that 
the Security Council rightly has, and advancing the (at the moment 
undoubtedly aspirational) international rule of law.142 If the Council truly 
intends to derogate from human rights, that intent must be manifested in the 
language of the resolution, and the reasons for doing should be explained 
openly, not left to backroom dealings between diplomats.143 
III. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS, DUALISM AND EQUIVALENT 
PROTECTION 
A. In Search for a Rule of Recognition 
Let us now examine what is probably both the easiest and the most 
drastic form of norm conflict avoidance – dualism. By dualism I simply 
mean the denial by a court or other relevant actor that two apparently 
conflicting norms belong to the same legal system, or at the very least to 
two systems which are functionally integrated. If they do not, they cannot 
truly conflict. To give an example, if the Security Council passed a 
resolution requiring all member states to preventatively detain suspected 
terrorists and deny them judicial review of that detention, that might suffice 
to displace or qualify the ECHR pursuant to Article 103 of the Charter. It 
would generally not be enough, however, to dispense with human rights 
protections granted by domestic constitutional law.144 If such a case would 
ever come before the United States Supreme Court, for instance, it would 
say that the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus can only be 
suspended by Congress in cases of rebellion or invasion, not by an organ of 
the UN.145 Indeed, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
already expressly ruled that Article 103 cannot displace domestic 
constitutional protections, despite the fact that the Constitution of Bosnia 
 
 142. See Chesterman, supra note 115, at 360-61. 
 143. See Johnstone, supra note 127, at 305-06 (emphasizing the need for the Council to justify its 
actions publicly). 
 144. Article 103 does not even purport to – it speaks only of Charter obligations prevailing over 
other international agreements. See also Feldman, supra note 109, at 3. 
 145. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2243 (2008). Indeed, U.S. courts entertain 
challenges based on the Due Process Clause of the Constitution in regard of targeted sanctions at issue 
in Kadi, as they are only concerned with domestic implementing legislation and executive acts, not with 
UN Security Council resolutions or Sanctions Committee designations, which have no effect in U.S. 
domestic law. See Daniel S. Meyers, The Transatlantic Divide over the Implementation and 
Enforcement of Security Council Resolutions, 38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 255, 276-82 (2008). 
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was actually adopted as a treaty, an annex of the Dayton Peace Accords.146 
To take a further example, in Al-Jedda the applicants argued before the 
lower UK courts that the rights enshrined in the Human Rights Act are 
domestic statutory rights that continue to exist even if their corresponding 
rights under the ECHR are displaced by Article 103. The lower courts 
disagreed, finding that these domestic rights mirror the rights in the ECHR, 
and fail whenever these fail. This issue was not raised on appeal before the 
House of Lords, which accordingly said nothing on the matter.147 
Pointing out that domestic law and international law are separate legal 
systems seems almost trivial, but it is instructive as it exposes some of the 
basic assumptions that we make when defining what actually constitutes a 
legal system. For instance, even when a particular municipal legal order is 
largely open to international law, by making treaties and/or custom part of 
the law of the land, we understand that international law enters the 
domestic legal order under the terms and conditions set out by that 
domestic order.148 From the international perspective we also perceive the 
now some two hundred domestic legal orders as distinct from the 
international one, not merely as its sub-systems.149 Contrary to some 
remarks of the CFI in Kadi,150 international law makes no claim of 
 
 146. Milorad Bilbija et al., No. AP-953/05, The Constitutional Ct. of Bosn. & Herz., paras. 61-76, 
(8 July 2006), available at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_news_id_113a.pdf (“Article 103 of the 
Charter of the United Nations deals only with a sub-set of possible conflicts of laws in public 
international law, namely conflicts between the obligations of Member States of the United Nations 
arising under different treaties. It does not attempt (and indeed would be powerless to attempt) to 
determine the effect of any such conflict on the obligations of the authorities of Member States under 
their national constitutional or legal orders.”). For more on this case and on the negative reaction it 
inspired from the international High Representative in Bosnia, see Feldman, supra note 109, at 24-29 
(Professor Feldman is a judge on the Constitutional Court of Bosnia). 
 147. See R (In re Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, para. 53, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2007/58.html. 
 148. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 218-19 (2d ed. 2005); see 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 10, 2004, docket no. 2 BvR 
1481/04, 111 BVerfGE 307, at paras 34-36, translated in http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ 
rs20041014_2bvr148104en.html (holding that “[t]he Basic Law is clearly based on the classic idea that 
the relationship of public international law and domestic law is a relationship between two different 
legal spheres and that the nature of this relationship can be determined from the viewpoint of domestic 
law only by domestic law itself . . . [The Basic Law] does not seek a submission to non-German acts of 
sovereignty that is removed from every constitutional limit and control.”). Case noted in Saša Beljin, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht on the Status of the European Convention of Human Rights and ECHR 
Decisions in the German Legal Order, 1 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 553 (2005). 
 149. But see Hans Kelsen, Les rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international 
public, 14 RECUEIL DES COURS 227, 289 (1926-IV) (arguing that international law and domestic law 
form a unitary legal system, where the latter draws validity from the former). 
 150. See Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, II-3712-13 (“From 
the standpoint of international law, the obligations of the Member States of the United Nations under 
the Charter of the United Nations clearly prevail over every other obligation of domestic law . . . .”). 
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prevailing over domestic law. International law is not hierarchically 
superior, but generally indifferent to what domestic law says – even up to 
the point of treating rules of domestic law as “facts.”151 Thus, it is perfectly 
normal for us to accept that the same act can be lawful under domestic law 
but unlawful under international law, or vice versa,152 just as an act can be 
lawful under German law but not under French law. That, not hierarchy, is 
the import of Article 27 of the VCLT when it states that “[a] party may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty.”153 Likewise, even when international law does take into 
account rules of domestic law, it does so on its own terms. For instance, in 
order to establish whether a particular actor qualifies as an organ of a state, 
international law will look at the domestic law of that state. It will still, 
however, attach organ status to an actor even if it is not designated as such 
by the state’s internal law, if the relationship between the state and the 
actor is of complete control on the one side, and complete dependence on 
the other.154 
Distinguishing between domestic law and international law comes 
easily. However, we have seen the applicants in Kadi argue that a Security 
Council resolution could not prevail over contrary human rights guarantees 
in EU law, as EU law is a legal order independent from the Charter and 
general international law. That dualist or fragmentationist argument failed 
before the CFI, but has now met with success before the Advocate General 
of the ECJ and before the ECJ itself. 
 
 151. See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No.7, at 19 (May 25) (“From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ, 
municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States, in the same 
manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures.”) 
 152. It is true that many or most domestic legal systems employ harmonious interpretation so as to 
avoid conflicts between domestic law and international law, in absence of the legislature clear intent to 
the contrary. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
However, this is not true norm conflict avoidance. What the courts try to avoid are situations in which 
an action which may be lawful under domestic law puts the state in breach of its international legal 
obligations. But this canon of interpretation quite clearly assumes that the domestic and international 
legal systems are separate, as the domestic legislature can indeed pass a valid statute which would be 
contrary to international law. 
 153. See Andreas Paulus, Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and Fragmentation, 74 NORDIC J. 
INT’L L. 297, 319-23 (2005) (explaining that the lack of any hierarchical ambition vis-à-vis domestic 
law extends even to jus cogens norms of international law). 
 154. See ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36, at art. 4(2); Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 109 (June 
27); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
and Herz. v. Serb. and Mont.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 1, paras. 390-95 (February 26). 
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In his opinion, Advocate General Maduro155 (AG) expressed strong 
disagreement with the reasoning of the CFI, particularly with its 
characterization of the relationship between international law and EU law. 
According to the AG, 
[T]he logical starting point of our discussion [of the relationship between 
international and Community law] should, of course, be the landmark 
ruling in Van Gend en Loos, in which the Court affirmed the autonomy 
of the Community legal order. The Court held that the Treaty is not 
merely an agreement between States, but an agreement between the 
peoples of Europe. It considered that the Treaty had established a ‘new 
legal order’, beholden to, but distinct from the existing legal order of 
public international law. In other words, the Treaty has created a 
municipal legal order of trans-national dimensions, of which it forms the 
‘basic constitutional charter’.156 
After reviewing the relevant case law of the ECJ, the AG argued that 
it would be wrong to conclude that, once the Community is bound by a 
rule of international law, the Community Courts must bow to that rule 
with complete acquiescence and apply it unconditionally in the 
Community legal order. The relationship between international law and 
the Community legal order is governed by the Community legal order 
itself, and international law can permeate that legal order only under the 
conditions set by the constitutional principles of the Community.157 
The AG could see nothing in the EU and EC treaties that would 
absolve measures implementing UN Security Council resolutions from the 
fundamental rights guarantees of the Community legal order. The AG was 
furthermore not persuaded by the argument of the EU institutions and the 
United Kingdom (relying on Behrami) that, in similar situations, even the 
European Court of Human Rights would not exercise jurisdiction. 
According to the AG, 
It is certainly correct to say that, in ensuring the observance of 
fundamental rights within the Community, the Court of Justice draws 
inspiration from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
None the less, there remain important differences between the two 
courts. The task of the European Court of Human Rights is to ensure the 
observance of the commitments entered into by the Contracting States 
under the Convention. Although the purpose of the Convention is the 
maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of the individual, it is designed to operate primarily as an 
 
 155. Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro (Jan. 16, 2008), available through database search at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/ 
j_6/home. 
 156. Id. at para. 21 (footnotes omitted). 
 157. Id. at para. 24 (footnote omitted). 
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interstate agreement which creates obligations between the Contracting 
Parties at the international level. This is illustrated by the Convention’s 
intergovernmental enforcement mechanism. The EC Treaty, by contrast, 
has founded an autonomous legal order, within which States as well as 
individuals have immediate rights and obligations. The duty of the Court 
of Justice is to act as the constitutional court of the municipal legal order 
that is the Community. The European Court of Human Rights and the 
Court of Justice are therefore unique as regards their jurisdiction ratione 
personae and as regards the relationship of their legal system with public 
international law. Thus, the Council, the Commission and the United 
Kingdom attempt to draw a parallel precisely where the analogy between 
the two Courts ends.158 
The AG proceeded to review the applicant’s human rights claim on 
the merits, finding that there is no reason for any sort of circumscribed 
review,159 and concluded that his right to be heard by EU institutions and 
his right to effective judicial review were infringed by the impugned 
regulation, taking into account the lack of a genuine and effective 
mechanism of judicial control by an independent tribunal at the UN 
level.160 
On appeal, the ECJ agreed entirely with the main strands of the AG’s 
reasoning.161 It first held that 
the Community is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its 
Member states nor its institutions can avoid review of the conformity of 
their acts with the basic constitutional charter, the EC Treaty, which 
established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed 
to enable the Court of Justice to review the legality of acts of the 
institutions . . . . It is also to be recalled that an international agreement 
cannot affect the allocation of powers fixed by the Treaties or, 
consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system, observance 
of which is ensured by the Court by virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction 
conferred on it by Article 220 EC, jurisdiction that the Court has, 
moreover, already held to form part of the very foundations of the 
Community.162 
Therefore, according to the Court, 
obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect 
of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which 
include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental 
 
 158. Id. at para. 37 (footnotes omitted). 
 159. Id. at paras. 44-46. 
 160. Id. at paras. 54-55. 
 161. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and 
Comm’n, Judgment, (Sept. 3, 2008), available through database search at http://curia.europa.eu/ 
jcms/jcms/j_6/home. 
 162. Id. at paras. 281-82 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
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rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is 
for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal 
remedies established by the Treaty.163 
The ECJ further noted that international law in no way prohibits the 
judicial review of domestic measures implementing a state’s international 
obligations, including obligations stemming from Chapter VII resolutions 
of the Security Council.164 The Court thus concluded that 
the review by the Court of the validity of any Community measure in the 
light of fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression, in a 
community based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee 
stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is 
not to be prejudiced by an international agreement. The question of the 
Court’s jurisdiction arises in the context of the internal and autonomous 
legal order of the Community, within whose ambit the contested 
regulation falls and in which the Court has jurisdiction to review the 
validity of Community measures in the light of fundamental rights.165 
The position of the CFI, on the one hand, and those of the AG and the 
ECJ, on the other, are worlds apart. The CFI views the EU legal order, 
though “autonomous,” as still essentially an inseparable part of the 
international legal order. For the AG and the ECJ, the EU legal order is not 
just autonomous, but also domestic, municipal, and, most importantly, 
constitutional.166 According to the AG and the ECJ, it is Community law 
that determines how international law operates within it, not the other way 
around. For them, the annulment of a regulation implementing a Security 
Council resolution and violating fundamental rights is a purely domestic 
affair, just as it would be for a United States court to review an 
implementing statute against the Constitution. 
This is a familiar debate. For most international lawyers, EU law 
might not be “just” regional international law, and is certainly to a large 
degree self-contained. But it still remains a subsystem of international law, 
if for no other reason because its founding instruments are treaties 
concluded between states.167 For EU lawyers, on the other hand, these 
 
 163. Id. at para. 285 (emphasis added). 
 164. Id. at paras. 298-99. 
 165. Id. at paras. 316-17. 
 166. See Comment by Andreas Paulus, at 13 (Jan. 17, 2008, 17:59 EST), http:// 
opiniojuris.org/2008/01/16/can-the-security-council-displace-human-rights-treaties-al-jedda-part-2/ 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2008) (noting the almost magical quality of the AG’s use of the word 
“constitution.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Trevor Hartley, International Law and the Law of the European Union – A 
Reassessment, 72 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.1, 2–3 (2001); Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and 
the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483, 516 (2006); Alain 
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treaties are constitutional instruments, which create a new, independent 
legal order with its own hierarchy of norms.168 Why labeling EU law as 
constitutional should necessarily render it non-international is rarely, if 
ever, explained. Weiler and Haltern have once persuasively argued that the 
question whether EU law is constitutional or international law poses a false 
dichotomy, as it can be both at the same time.169 But, for the AG and the 
ECJ in Kadi at least, and probably EU lawyers generally,170 the dichotomy 
is ultimately neither false nor inconsequential, as the true test for whether 
EU law is part of international law comes when international law, in the 
guise of Article 103 of the Charter, claims primacy, and EU (constitutional) 
law either accepts this claim or refuses to give in.171 For EU lawyers, the 
opinions of the AG and the ECJ are perfectly logical and sensible, but that 
is only because they assume, and fervently believe, that the EU legal order 
is independent, municipal and constitutional. For general international 
lawyers, on the other hand, it is the CFI’s judgment that is perfectly logical 
and sensible, because for them something that is created by treaty, no 
matter how self-contained, cannot but be a part of a unified, universal 
international legal order.172 
 
Pellet, Les fondements juridiques internationaux du droit communautaire, 5 COLLECTED COURSES OF 
THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 193, 249 (1994). 
 168. See, e.g., Nikolaos Lavranos, Judicial Review of UN Sanctions by the Court of First Instance, 
11 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 471, 477-80 (2006); Christina Eckes, Judicial Review of European Anti-
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It further must be noted just how completely atextual the debate is. In 
reality it has nothing to do with logic, though it is frequently represented as 
such, nor is it about the interpretation of a particular provision in this treaty 
or that, but about the basic assumptions that underlie our thinking about the 
law and about what constitutes a legal system. It is thus contingent upon 
perspectives, ideologies and normative agendas. Everybody concerned has 
their own vision of the international legal order, or their own 
“constitutional” project, European or global. 
Most remarkably for a general international lawyer, neither the AG 
nor the ECJ in Kadi ever explain what exactly in their view makes the EU 
legal order distinct and independent from international law. Again, the 
various EU treaties certainly do not say so.173 At best, their argument is 
conclusory, even solipsistic – we say EU law is constitutional, therefore it 
is constitutional, and therefore it is not international. These leaps in logic 
are most evident when the AG and the ECJ struggle to explain why the EU 
treaties establish an independent, constitutional legal order, while another 
treaty, the ECHR, that also creates individual and not just inter-state rights, 
still remains “merely” international and can thus be overridden by the 
Security Council, as happened in Al-Jedda.174 
Again, the purpose of this discussion of Kadi is not to demonstrate 
that either the CFI’s or the ECJ’s judgment were “wrongly decided,” but to 
show how both the CFI and the AG and ECJ proceeded in their analysis 
from a different set of basic assumptions about the nature of their legal 
system. Such assumptions exist in all legal systems, even if they are not 
written down in a foundational text, and are usually not assessed or 
discussed, but are considered axiomatic and are relied on as a matter of 
course. 
These assumptions are considered axiomatic, that is, until they are 
actually challenged and possibly changed when the underlying social or 
ideological superstructure changes. Fluctuations in these assumptions, 
 
configuration thus attained is a well-balanced construction, suited to foster international cooperation 
within a homogeneous world order system.” Observe also, for example, the confidence with which 
Pauwelyn asserts that “states can ‘contract out’ of . . . [some] rules of international law . . . but . . . [not] 
out of the system of international law,” a proposition that he believes has the status of jus cogens. 
PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 37. 
 173. See Hartley, supra note 167, at 7-9. 
 174. See Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro, para. 37 (Jan. 16, 2008), available through database search at http://curia.europa.eu/ 
jcms/jcms/j_6/home; Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. 
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which are in Hartian terms, if you will, a facet of the rule of recognition,175 
explain how some very fundamental questions can remain unresolved (or 
are reopened and resolved anew over and over again) even in some very 
mature legal systems. Thus, for instance, even more than two hundred 
years after the adoption of the United States Constitution, and despite the 
fact that the Constitution has at least one explicit provision on the 
relationship between domestic law and international law in the Supremacy 
Clause, courts and academics can still have rancorous debates about what 
counts as a self-executing treaty, whether non-self-executing treaties are 
the law of the land,176 and what is the precise status of customary 
international law in the United States legal system.177 
B. Solange and Equivalent Protection 
Back to Kadi, there is no small irony in the AG’s and the ECJ’s 
juxtaposition of the constitutional to the international. We may recall that 
just a few decades ago it was Community law, spearheaded by the ECJ, 
that claimed direct effect and primacy over the national legal orders of the 
member states, asserting somewhat arrogantly that it prevailed even over 
contrary constitutional domestic guarantees of human rights. That claim to 
supremacy – bolder by far than that of Article 103 of the Charter – could 
not have succeeded merely on the ECJ’s say-so. It depended on whether the 
member states, through their highest courts, would accept the ECJ’s 
assertion of authority. As is well known, they did, but not unconditionally. 
In Solange I178 the German Constitutional Court held that it has the power 
to review the compatibility of EC acts and legislation with the German 
 
 175. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100-10 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d 
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 176. Cf. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
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Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Non-
preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 555 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part 
of Our Law, 98 AM. J. I’NTL L. 43 (2004); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law 
Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007). Similar debates on the application of customary 
international law in the domestic sphere have taken place in the United Kingdom as well, though there 
is much less controversy there in comparison to the United States. See, e.g., Trendtex Trading Corp. v. 
Cen. Bank of Nig. [1977] Q.B. 529, 553-54 (C.A.) (per Lord Denning) (discussing the differences 
between the doctrines of incorporation and transformation in the application of customary international 
law within the UK legal system); J. G. Collier, Is International Law Really Part of the Law of 
England?, 39 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 924 (1989). 
 178. Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] May 29, 1974, 37 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 271 (F.R.G). 
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Constitution, while in Solange II179 it accepted the primacy of EC law in 
principle, but reserved for itself the power of review if the EC fails to 
provide at Community level an equivalent protection of human rights to the 
one enjoyed by individuals at the domestic level.180 So long as (so lange) 
the EC did provide such equivalent protection, the Court would not 
interfere. 
Like Kadi, the Solange saga exposes two problems. On the one hand 
is the relationship between two legal orders, on the other the conflict of 
norms belonging to these two legal orders. As we have seen above, a norm 
conflict can arise only within the same legal system, or within two systems 
which are functionally integrated. Thus, in Van Gend and Costa v. ENEL 
the ECJ knocked on the doors of the municipal legal systems.181 In Solange 
and like cases, the municipal courts responded by letting the ECJ and EU 
law in, on the condition that they behave themselves. Hence we can say 
that EU law and the municipal legal systems of EU member states are to a 
large extent integrated legal systems, but they are still distinct because 
neither draws validity from the other.182 
In the case of norm conflict between a norm of EU law and a domestic 
constitutional norm protecting human rights, the ECJ asserted that the 
former prevails, while domestic constitutional courts opted for the latter. 
To this day there remains a frequently revisited, unresolved tension in the 
interaction between the EU legal order and that of its member states, 
between integration and supremacy of EU law, on the one hand, and 
fragmentation, spurred by constitutional concerns about democracy, 
legitimacy and human rights on the other.183 This explains why even the 
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 182. For a more sophisticated take on the relationship between EU law and the legal systems of its 
member states, see Julie Dickson, How Many Legal Systems?: Some Puzzles Regarding the Identity 
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Paper No. 40/2008 (October 6, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1279612. 
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Constitucional (Spanish Constitutional Court), Opinion 1/2004 of 13 December 2004, on the Treaty 
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Constitutional Court decision denying absolute supremacy to EU law over national constitutional law). 
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constitutional courts of new EU member states adopted their own variants 
of Solange, despite the decades of development regarding the protection of 
fundamental rights at EU level.184 This confrontation is suspended only so 
long as EU institutions do not start behaving outrageously – in the 
assessment of domestic constitutional law – regarding human rights. As we 
have seen above, a similar incentive is at work when courts are reluctant to 
review the decisions of the UN Security Council. 
C. The ECHR and Equivalent Protection 
The principle of equivalent protection also found its way into the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in its Bosphorus line 
of cases. In 1990, the European Commission on Human Rights decided its 
very first case on equivalent protection, M. & Co. v. Germany.185 It dealt 
(appropriately enough) with the responsibility of the member states of the 
European Community for implementing the acts of the Community itself. 
The applicant was a company incorporated in Germany that was 
heavily fined by the EC Commission for antitrust violations. The applicant 
alleged, inter alia, that when it lodged its appeal against the EC 
Commission’s decision with the ECJ, the ECJ did not comport with the fair 
trial guarantees in Article 6 of the ECHR. According to the applicant, when 
Germany transferred its competencies to the EC and enforced such a 
flawed decision by the EC institutions, it violated its own obligations under 
the ECHR. 
The European Commission remarked that 
[T]he Convention does not prohibit a Member State from transferring 
powers to international organisations. Nonetheless, The Commission 
recalls that “if a State contracts treaty obligations and subsequently 
concludes another international agreement which disables it from 
performing its obligations under the first treaty it will be answerable for 
any resulting breach of its obligations under the earlier treaty” (cf. N° 
235/56, Dec. 10.6.58, Yearbook 2 p. 256 (300)). The Commission 
 
 184. See, e.g., the Decision of 8 March 2006 of the Czech Constitutional Court in case No. Pl. US 
50/04 Sugar Quotas, published as No. 156/2006 Coll., official English translation available at 
http://test.concourt.cz/angl_verze/cases.html (holding that EU law must not infringe upon core 
constitutional principles, and applying the Solange equivalent protection doctrine for the protection of 
human rights.). Case noted in Jiří Zemánek, The Emerging Czech Constitutional Doctrine of European 
Law, 3 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 418 (2007). A similar decision was rendered by the Polish Constitutional 
Court – noted in Adam Lazowski, Conformity of the Accession Treaty with the Polish Constitution. 
Decision of 11 May 2005., 3 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 148 (2007). See also Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Solange, 
chapter 3’: Constitutional Courts in Central Europe – Democracy – European Union, 14 EUR. L.J. 1 
(2008). 
 185. App. No. 13258/77, 64 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 138 (1990), available through the 
HUDOC database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
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considers that a transfer of powers does not necessarily exclude a State’s 
responsibility under the Convention with regard to the exercise of the 
transferred powers. Otherwise the guarantees of the Convention could 
wantonly be limited or excluded and thus be deprived of their 
peremptory character. The object and purpose of the Convention as an 
instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its 
provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards 
practical and effective (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Soering judgment of 7 July 
1989, Series A no. 161, para. 87). Therefore the transfer of powers to an 
international organisation is not incompatible with the Convention 
provided that within that organisation fundamental rights will receive an 
equivalent protection.186 
The Commission then noted that the legal system of the European 
Communities not only secures fundamental rights but also provides for 
control of their observance. Indeed, the ECJ heard the applicant’s case, and 
found that its right to a fair hearing was not violated on the merits. 
Moreover, 
The Commission has also taken into consideration that it would be 
contrary to the very idea of transferring powers to an international 
organisation to hold the member States responsible for examining, in 
each individual case before issuing a writ of execution for a judgment of 
the European Court of Justice, whether Article 6 (Art. 6) of the 
Convention was respected in the underlying proceedings.187 
Hence, the application was incompatible ratione materiae with the ECHR 
and declared inadmissible. 
The Commission’s reasoning is rather laconic. It first notes that a state 
which concludes a treaty that would conflict with the ECHR would incur 
responsibility for doing so, and buttresses this conclusion by reference to 
the ECHR’s object and purpose. Then, however, out of thin air the 
Commission conjures up the principle of equivalent protection. It cites 
absolutely no support for such a rule, nor does it acknowledge its 
intellectual debt to the Solange jurisprudence. But more important is how 
the Commission uses the principle of equivalent protection. In norm 
conflict terms, it is a method of conflict avoidance through harmonious 
interpretation. A conflict between the ECHR and the EC treaty is avoided, 
as the ECHR itself does not prohibit a transfer of powers via treaty to an 
international organization if that organization provides an equivalent 
protection of fundamental rights. 
So, like in Solange, equivalent protection is used as a mechanism of 
conflict avoidance. However, M. & Co. differs from Solange in two 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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important respects, as does its progeny. First, there is no doubt in the 
Commission’s mind that the two potentially conflicting norms belong to 
the same legal system. Both the EC Treaty and the ECHR are treaties 
governed by public international law – it is just that if a state party to both 
treaties cannot comply with one of them without violating the other, it will 
incur state responsibility as it commits a wrongful act under the latter 
treaty. In Solange, on the other hand, the German Constitutional Court 
allowed Community law to permeate the distinct domestic sphere, on 
certain conditions. Second, unlike in Solange, where Community law 
claimed primacy over domestic law, there was no such claim here. As a 
matter of international law, neither the EC Treaty nor the ECHR prevail 
over one another in any hierarchical sense. It is true that the Commission 
says that a transfer of powers cannot be allowed to deprive the human 
rights guarantees of the ECHR of their “peremptory character,” but that is 
no more than rhetorical flourish. The Commission cannot be saying that the 
ECHR as a whole is jus cogens, invalidating any conflicting treaties. 
Surely, the right to a fair hearing in antitrust cases does not qualify as a 
peremptory norm by any definition of the term. 
Nine years after M. & Co., the European Court of Human Rights first 
grappled with the principle of equivalent protection in three cases decided 
on the same day by its Grand Chamber: Waite and Kennedy v. Germany,188 
Beer and Regan v. Germany,189 and Matthews v. United Kingdom.190 The 
first two cases are for all practical purposes identical, so only Waite and 
Kennedy will be referred to hereafter. The applicants in that case were two 
former temporary workers of the European Space Agency (ESA), 
employed on a project based in Germany. When their contracts were 
terminated, they tried to contest that decision before German labor courts. 
The courts denied them relief, on the grounds that the ESA Convention, to 
which Germany was a party, provided for the immunity of the ESA from 
domestic jurisdiction. Before the European Court, the applicant claimed 
that the denial of relief was a violation of their right of access to a court 
under Article 6 of the ECHR. 
The Court was of the opinion that 
[w]here States establish international organisations in order to pursue or 
strengthen their cooperation in certain fields of activities, and where they 
 
 188. App. No. 26083/94, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 261 (1999), available through the HUDOC database at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 189. App. No. 28934/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), available through the HUDOC database at http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 190. App. No. 24833/94, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 361 (1999), available through the HUDOC database at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
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attribute to these organisations certain competences and accord them 
immunities, there may be implications as to the protection of 
fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and object 
of the Convention, however, if the Contracting States were thereby 
absolved from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the 
field of activity covered by such attribution. . . . For the Court, a material 
factor in determining whether granting ESA immunity from German 
jurisdiction is permissible under the Convention is whether the 
applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect 
effectively their rights under the Convention.191 
The ESA did provide such alternative means, through an 
administrative appeals board. Moreover, 
bearing in mind the legitimate aim of immunities of international 
organisations . . . the test of proportionality cannot be applied in such a 
way as to compel an international organisation to submit itself to 
national litigation in relation to employment conditions prescribed under 
national labour law. To read Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and its 
guarantee of access to court as necessarily requiring the application of 
national legislation in such matters would, in the Court’s view, thwart 
the proper functioning of international organisations and run counter to 
the current trend towards extending and strengthening international 
cooperation.192 
Therefore, the Court found Germany’s grant of immunity to the ESA to be 
proportionate under Article 6 and within its margin of appreciation.193 
As in M. & Co., the Court was faced with an apparent or potential 
norm conflict, this time between the ESA Convention and the ECHR. And, 
again as in M. & Co., the Court interpreted the ECHR narrowly, by saying 
that if the ESA provided “reasonable alternative means” for protecting the 
applicants’ rights, a restriction on their access to German courts was 
proportionate. 
The Matthews case was significantly different – not only was a norm 
conflict not avoidable through equivalent protection, it was also 
unresolvable. The applicant in that case was a citizen of Gibraltar, an 
overseas territory of the United Kingdom, who was denied the opportunity 
to vote for the European Parliament. Namely, a 1976 Act of the European 
Council, agreed upon by all EC member states and having treaty status, 
withheld the franchise for EC parliamentary elections from the people of 
Gibraltar, as it prescribed in its Annex II that “[t]he United Kingdom will 
 
 191. Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 67-68, available through the 
HUDOC database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 192. Id. at para. 72. 
 193. Id. at para. 73. 
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apply the provisions of this Act only in respect of the United Kingdom,” 
thus excluding its dependencies and overseas territories194 (mainly due to a 
long-standing bilateral dispute between Spain and the UK on the status of 
Gibraltar). The applicant alleged a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to 
the ECHR, which provides that “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake 
to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under 
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the 
people in the choice of the legislature.” 
The Court first reasoned as follows: 
In the present case, the alleged violation of the Convention flows from 
an annex to the 1976 Act, entered into by the United Kingdom, together 
with the extension to the European Parliament’s competences brought 
about by the Maastricht Treaty. The Council Decision and the 1976 Act 
(see paragraph 18 above), and the Maastricht Treaty, with its changes to 
the EEC Treaty, all constituted international instruments which were 
freely entered into by the United Kingdom. Indeed, the 1976 Act cannot 
be challenged before the European Court of Justice for the very reason 
that it is not a “normal” act of the Community, but is a treaty within the 
Community legal order. The Maastricht Treaty, too, is not an act of the 
Community, but a treaty by which a revision of the EEC Treaty was 
brought about. The United Kingdom, together with all the other parties 
to the Maastricht Treaty, is responsible ratione materiae under Article 1 
of the Convention and, in particular, under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, 
for the consequences of that Treaty. 
In determining to what extent the United Kingdom is responsible for 
“securing” the rights in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of elections 
to the European Parliament in Gibraltar, the Court recalls that the 
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or 
illusory, but practical and effective . . . . It is uncontested that legislation 
emanating from the legislative process of the European Community 
affects the population of Gibraltar in the same way as legislation which 
enters the domestic legal order exclusively via the House of Assembly. 
To this extent, there is no difference between European and domestic 
legislation, and no reason why the United Kingdom should not be 
required to “secure” the rights in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of 
European legislation, in the same way as those rights are required to be 
“secured” in respect of purely domestic legislation. In particular, the 
suggestion that the United Kingdom may not have effective control over 
the state of affairs complained of cannot affect the position, as the United 
Kingdom’s responsibility derives from its having entered into treaty 
commitments subsequent to the applicability of Article 3 of Protocol No. 
1 to Gibraltar, namely the Maastricht Treaty taken together with its 
obligations under the Council Decision and the 1976 Act. Further, the 
 
 194. Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 17-18 (18 February 
1999), available through the HUDOC database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
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Court notes that on acceding to the EC Treaty, the United Kingdom 
chose, by virtue of Article 227(4) of the Treaty, to have substantial areas 
of EC legislation applied to Gibraltar . . . .195 
The Court then found that “no reason has been made out which could 
justify excluding the European Parliament from the ambit of the elections 
referred to in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 on the ground that it is a 
supranational, rather than a purely domestic, representative organ.”196 
Moreover, the competences of the European Parliament indicated that it 
could be considered as a part of Gibraltar’s legislature within the meaning 
of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which was thus fully applicable.197 Hence, as 
the citizens of Gibraltar were completely denied the right to vote at the 
elections for the European Parliament, the Court found a violation of 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.198 
For the European Court in Matthews, a norm conflict was genuine and 
could not be avoided. On the one hand, the ECHR required the United 
Kingdom to allow elections for the European Parliament in Gibraltar. On the 
other, the United Kingdom was prohibited from allowing such elections by 
another treaty, the 1976 Act. In such a situation, the European Court did the 
only thing that it could by ruling that the United Kingdom could not escape 
its responsibility under the ECHR by honoring another treaty commitment, 
which it entered into freely. Moreover, because the ECJ could not review the 
1976 Act on human rights grounds as it had treaty status within the EC legal 
order, the principle of equivalent protection could not be used to avoid the 
norm conflict. 
Matthews is a fascinating case for two more reasons. First, not only was 
the norm conflict unavoidable, it was also unresolvable. Even if the 
European Court possessed some sort of general subject-matter jurisdiction as 
does the ICJ, it could not give formal priority either to the ECHR or to the 
1976 Act. Both of these instruments were valid, legally binding treaties, and 
no rule of conflict resolution could have been used to invalidate or prioritize 
either.199 In essence, no judicial body could ever resolve such a conflict, 
 
 195. Id. at paras. 33-34. 
 196. Id. at para. 36. 
 197. Id. at paras. 45-54. 
 198. Id. at paras. 64-65. 
 199. Specifically, the conflict rules in Art. 30 of the VCLT are completely useless in a case like 
Matthews. First, the ECHR and the 1976 Act can hardly be said to be treaties relating to the same 
subject matter, rendering Art. 30 inapplicable from the very start. But even if this (admittedly entirely 
arbitrary) criterion is to be interpreted expansively, as suggested by the ILC – see ILC Study, supra note 
1, para. 254 – the conflict rules in Art. 30 would work no better. The application of lex posterior is to an 
extent hindered by the temporal dimension of the norm conflict that will be explored below. More 
importantly, lex posterior cannot be applied simply because the parties to the two treaties were not 
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which can only have a political solution.200 Solely the states which created 
such a conflict by concluding two contradictory treaties could put it at rest,201 
and that, as we shall see presently, is exactly what they did. 
The second intriguing aspect of the norm conflict in Matthews is its 
temporal dimension. As was noted by dissenting Judges Freeland and 
Jungwiert, at the time of its adoption, the 1976 Act was not incompatible 
with the ECHR, as the EC Assembly (as it then was) could on no view be 
regarded as a “legislature” within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
to the ECHR.202 Indeed, it was accepted by the majority that it was the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty that upgraded, as it were, the European Parliament’s status 
to a proper legislature, and only this made Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 
applicable.203 There was thus a period of almost twenty years in which the 
two norms coexisted, but did not conflict. 
The political solution to the norm conflict was found when Spain 
agreed not to object to the United Kingdom’s extension of the franchise to 
Gibraltar, as it understood that the United Kingdom was trying to 
implement its ECHR obligations and a binding decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights.204 However, when the United Kingdom passed the 
European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003 (EPRA), Spain did not 
want to give the UK an entirely free pass, since in its view the UK, inter 
alia, improperly included Gibraltar within one of its preexisting electoral 
districts in England and Wales instead of giving it a distinct status. Spain 
thus initiated an interstate action before the ECJ challenging the EPRA’s 
compatibility with the 1976 Act. In its defense, the UK argued that the 
Annex to the 1976 Act should be interpreted as far as possible to be 
compatible with the ECHR and that it should not be a bar to it extending 
the franchise to Gibraltar via EPRA. Moreover, though Gibraltar was for 
electoral purposes incorporated into an electoral district within England, it 
 
identical, as required by Art. 30(3). But even if the parties were identical – say if the membership of the 
Council of Europe and the EU was at the time one and the same – there is absolutely no indication that 
the parties to the latter treaty had any intention of modifying the ECHR. If anything, they thought that 
they were acting consistently with the ECHR. Lex posterior, which is by its nature a presumption about 
states’ intent (see Borgen, supra note 29, at 587), cannot be used to produce results that states cannot 
possibly have intended. 
 200. See PAUWELYN, supra note 15, at 418-22. 
 201. See, Hartley, supra note 167, at 30-35. 
 202. Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 9 (18 February 1999), 
available through the HUDOC database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (Freeland, J. and 
Jungwiert, J. dissenting on the grounds that even in 1999 the European Parliament would not qualify as 
a “legislature” within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR). 
 203. Id. paras. 33-34. 
 204. See Case C-145/04, Spain v. United Kingdom, 2006 E.C.R. I-07917, I-7924 (reproducing the 
text of the declaration of the two governments). 
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did not thereby become, under domestic law, a part of the United 
Kingdom.205 
The ECJ agreed with the UK’s argument and held that even though 
the Annex to the 1976 Act continued to be in force, it should not be 
interpreted as preventing the extension of the franchise, as mandated by the 
ECHR.206 In other words, the ECJ retroactively interpreted the 1976 Act to 
make it compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, even 
though after Matthews was decided everyone involved thought that it was 
incompatible. Thus, we can bear witness to the extraordinary narrative of 
two norms, the ECHR and the 1976 Act. These treaties textually did not 
change at all in their thirty years of coexistence, which were for the better 
part of these thirty years thought not to conflict, then suddenly did conflict 
because of the Treaty of Maastricht. Then that judicially unresolvable 
conflict seemed to have ended through a negotiated deal, only for the ECJ 
to say that there was no conflict in the first place. 
Let us now turn to the latest, and perhaps most instructive European 
Court case on equivalent protection, Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland, which 
is unlike Matthews a most successful example of norm conflict 
avoidance.207 From 1991 onward, the UN Security Council was enacting 
measures in relation to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, including a 
variety of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). On 
17 April 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 820 (1993), 
providing that states should impound, inter alia, all aircraft in their 
territories “in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or 
undertaking in or operating” from the FRY. That Resolution was 
implemented in Community law by EC Regulation 990/93.208 The applicant 
was a Turkish airline charter company, which leased a plane from JAT, the 
FRY’s airline. When the plane landed in Ireland for repairs, it was 
impounded by the Irish authorities on the basis of the EC Regulation. As 
the plane was leased from and not operated by JAT, the Irish authorities 
asked the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council for an opinion on 
whether the plane was covered by the Council’s sanctions regime, and got 
an affirmative answer.209 The applicant challenged the impounding decision 
before Irish courts, which referred the question whether the EC regulation 
 
 205. Id. at I-7939 to I-7940. 
 206. Id. at I-7940 to I-7942. 
 207. Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ir., App. No. 45036/98, 2005-
VII Eur. Ct. H. R. 109, 42 E.H.R.R 1 (30 June 2005), available through the HUDOC database at http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 208. Id. para. 16. 
 209. Id. paras. 21-22. 
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applied to an aircraft leased from JAT to the ECJ. The ECJ found that it 
did, and that the restrictions on the applicant’s right to enjoy its property 
were justified on the account of public interest, as their purpose was to 
secure international peace and security.210 
Before the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant maintained 
that the manner in which Ireland implemented the sanctions regime to 
impound its aircraft amounted to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
to the ECHR, which protects the right to property.211 For its part, the 
respondent government argued that it was merely enforcing a binding 
regulation of the EC, in which it had no discretion of its own. According to 
the government, so long as the EC provided equivalent protection of human 
rights to that of the ECHR, Ireland could not bear responsibility for 
implementing its EC obligations.212 
The Court first remarked that the legal basis for impounding the 
aircraft was undoubtedly the EC regulation. Moreover, according to the 
Court, 
It is true that the Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 originated in a UNSC 
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (a 
point developed in some detail by the Government and certain third 
parties). While the resolution was pertinent to the interpretation of the 
regulation, the resolution did not form part of Irish domestic law and 
could not therefore have constituted a legal basis for the impoundment of 
the aircraft by the Minister for Transport. 
Accordingly, the Irish authorities rightly considered themselves obliged 
to impound any departing aircraft to which they considered Article 8 of 
Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 applied. Their decision that it did so apply 
was later confirmed, in particular, by the ECJ.213 
The Court then found that “the impugned interference was not the 
result of an exercise of discretion by the Irish authorities, either under 
Community or Irish law, but rather amounted to compliance by the Irish 
State with its legal obligations flowing from Community law and, in 
particular, Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93.”214 Furthermore, to 
assess the applicant’s claim on the merits, the Court held that it had to 
enquire whether there was “a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
 
 210. Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transp., Energy 
and Comm’ns, Ir. and the Attorney Gen., 1996 E.C.R. I-3953. 
 211. Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ir., App. No. 45036/98, 2005-
VII Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 107, 42 E.H.R.R 1 (30 June 2005), available through the HUDOC database at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 212. Id. paras. 109-10. 
 213. Id. para. 145 (citations omitted). 
 214. Id. para. 148. 
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between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised,” in other 
words “whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the 
general interest in this respect and the interest of the individual company 
concerned.”215 Hence, 
the Court has recognised that absolving Contracting States completely 
from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered by such a 
transfer would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the 
Convention; the guarantees of the Convention could be limited or 
excluded at will thereby depriving it of its peremptory character and 
undermining the practical and effective nature of its safeguards. The 
State is considered to retain Convention liability in respect of treaty 
commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention. 
In the Court’s view, State action taken in compliance with such legal 
obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered 
to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees 
offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner 
which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the 
Convention provides. By “equivalent” the Court means “comparable”; 
any requirement that the organisation’s protection be “identical” could 
run counter to the interest of international co-operation pursued. 
However, any such finding of equivalence could not be final and would 
be susceptible to review in the light of any relevant change in 
fundamental rights protection.216 
Moreover, according to the Court, 
If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the 
organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from 
the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than 
implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the 
organisation. 
However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances 
of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention 
rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international 
co-operation would be outweighed by the Convention’s role as a 
“constitutional instrument of European public order” in the field of 
human rights. 
It remains the case that a State would be fully responsible under the 
Convention for all acts falling outside its strict international legal 
obligations.217 
As, in the Court’s view, the “impugned measure constituted solely 
compliance by Ireland with its legal obligations flowing from membership 
 
 215. Id. para. 149. 
 216. Id. paras. 154-55 (citations omitted). 
 217. Id. paras. 156-57 (citations omitted). 
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of the European Community,”218 and as the EC institutions, most of all the 
ECJ, do provide an equivalent protection of fundamental rights to that of 
the ECHR system, “the presumption arises that Ireland did not depart from 
the requirements of the Convention when it implemented legal obligations 
flowing from its membership of the European Community.”219 The Court 
considered it clear that “there was no dysfunction of the mechanisms of 
control of the observance of Convention rights” within the EC legal system 
and that “it cannot be said that the protection of the applicant company’s 
Convention rights was manifestly deficient.”220 Consequently the 
presumption was not rebutted,221 and the applicant’s claim was rejected. 
Let us now cast Bosphorus in the terms of our enquiry into norm 
conflict. First, the principle of equivalent protection under the ECHR is 
applicable only when a state “does no more than implement legal 
obligations” it assumed under some other treaty, in other words, when it 
has no independent discretion.222 As we have seen above, discretion was 
also instrumental for the CFI when it distinguished the OMPI case from 
Kadi. If discretion exists under a norm laid down either in an EC regulation 
or in a Security Council resolution, it does not truly conflict with an ECHR 
obligation. Thus, if there was no norm conflict in Bosphorus because 
Ireland had discretion as to whether to impound the aircraft or not, the 
applicant’s claim would have been assessed on its merits like any other. 
Second, if there is no such discretion and an apparent norm conflict 
exists, a presumption will arise that there is no norm conflict with the 
ECHR if the treaty arrangement in question provides, as a general matter, 
an equivalent protection of human rights.223 In the Court’s view, that 
presumption is very strong – it can only be rebutted if the protection of 
human rights was shown to be manifestly deficient in the circumstances of 
that particular case.224 Indeed, in their joint concurring opinion in 
Bosphorus several judges disagreed with the majority precisely on whether 
the presumption should be so strict, or whether a looser standard than 
 
 218. Id. para. 158. 
 219. Id. para. 165 (citations omitted). 
 220. Id. para. 166. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. para. 156. 
 223. Id. paras. 154-55. Contra Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, App. NO. 26083/94, 30 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 261 (18 February 1999), available through the HUDOC database at http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (interpreting solely Article 6 of the ECHR as not being infringed if the 
international organization to which the state has given immunity provides reasonable alternatives to 
judicial review). 
 224. Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ir., App. No. 45036/98, 2005-
VII Eur. Ct. H. R. 109, 42 E.H.R.R. 1, para. 156, available through the HUDOC database at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
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“manifestly deficient” protection should be employed.225 For our present 
purposes, it is immaterial whether the presumption should be stronger or 
weaker, or indeed whether it should have been employed at all by the 
Court.226 The important thing is that it was. As we have seen above, such 
interpretative presumptions, where a norm – in this case that of the ECHR 
– is interpreted narrowly so as not to conflict with other norms – are an 
omnipresent method of avoiding norm conflict. 
Third, it must be realized that the outcome of the presumption being 
rebutted and of the Court finding in favor of the applicant on the merits of 
his claim would have been an unresolvable norm conflict. In Bosphorus, 
such a norm conflict would exist between the ECHR on the one hand, and 
the EC Treaty, requiring Ireland to comply with an EC regulation, on the 
other. Again, no legal rule could resolve such a genuine conflict – it could 
only have a political solution in the repeal or amendment of either of the 
conflicting norms (though, of course, a repeal of an EC regulation would 
politically be a far more likely outcome than an amendment to the ECHR). 
Finally, despite the fact that it was dealing with an EC regulation 
implementing a Security Council resolution, no hierarchy argument based 
on Article 103 of the Charter was made in Bosphorus. As the Court took 
great pains to make clear, the case was framed in such a way that an 
apparent norm conflict existed solely between the ECHR and EU law, not 
between the ECHR and a UN Security Council resolution.227 The plane was 
impounded on the basis of the regulation, not the resolution, as the 
resolution did not form a part of Irish domestic law while the regulation did 
have direct effect.228 Moreover, as we have seen above, an argument based 
on hierarchy was not made in any of the equivalent protection cases under 
 
 225. Id. (Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki, joint concurrence). 
 226. See generally Steve Peers, Limited Responsibility of European Union Member States for 
Actions within the Scope of Community Law, 2 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 443 (2006) (criticizing the holding 
of Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland for applying the presumption that no norm conflict exists with the 
ECHR if there is an equal protection of human rights provided by the treaty arrangement); Sionaidh 
Douglas-Scott, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, 43 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 243 (2006) (addressing the interaction between the EU and the European Court of Human 
Rights through the lens of Bosphorus); Cathryn Costello, The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court 
of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87 
(2006) (analyzing the doctrine of “equivalent protection” as used in the Bosphorus case). 
 227. See also Christina Eckes, Does the European Court of Human Rights Provide Protection from 
the European Community? – The Case of Bosphorus Airways, 13 EUR. PUB. L. 47, 61 (2007), (“The 
only clear conclusion is that the Court consciously did not mention the Security Council resolution. By 
doing so, it successfully got around taking an open stand on the hierarchy between UN law and the 
Convention.”) 
 228. Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ir., App. No. 45036/98, 2005-
VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 109, 42 E.H.R.R 1, paras. 35, 145, available through the HUDOC database at http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
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the ECHR. This is a crucial distinction between these cases and Solange. 
But now, let us turn to the last of the problems regarding equivalent 
protection that will be discussed here: whether the doctrine could indeed be 
applied in cases where a hierarchy argument is made, such as Kadi and Al-
Jedda. 
D. Article 103 of the Charter and Equivalent Protection 
In Kadi, the AG concluded his opinion by mentioning something quite 
a bit like the equivalent protection doctrine: 
Had there been a genuine and effective mechanism of judicial control by 
an independent tribunal at the level of the United Nations, then this 
might have released the Community from the obligation to provide for 
judicial control of implementing measures that apply within the 
Community legal order. However, no such mechanism currently exists. 
As the Commission and the Council themselves have stressed in their 
pleadings, the decision whether or not to remove a person from the 
United Nations sanctions list remains within the full discretion of the 
Sanctions Committee – a diplomatic organ. In those circumstances, it 
must be held that the right to judicial review by an independent tribunal 
has not been secured at the level of the United Nations. As a 
consequence, the Community institutions cannot dispense with proper 
judicial review proceedings when implementing the Security Council 
resolutions in question within the Community legal order.229 
With this paragraph, the equivalent protections story, started in 
Solange when the German Constitutional Court resisted the ECJ’s assertion 
that EC law trumps domestic constitutional law, even its guarantees of 
human rights, came to a full circle with the AG using the exact same 
rationale to protect human rights guaranteed by EC law against the 
intrusion of the Security Council. But make no mistake – the equivalent 
protection doctrine was not a major part of the AG’s opinion. Note that he 
says that equivalent protection at the UN level might have released the EC 
from its obligation of providing judicial review, not that it would. 
Moreover, his entire reasoning is based on the view that the UN Charter 
and Security Council resolutions have no direct effect in EU/EC law, just 
as they have no such effect in Irish, English or German law. As the two 
norms as such conceptually cannot conflict, equivalent protection is simply 
not relevant as a tool of conflict avoidance.230 
 
 229. Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro, para. 54 (Jan. 16, 2008), available through database search at http://curia.europa.eu/ 
jcms/jcms/j_6/home. 
 230. Contra Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council 
and 
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On the other hand, in Behrami and Al-Jedda there was (in principle) 
no dispute that the ECHR and the UN Charter belong to the same 
international legal system, and thus could directly conflict with one 
another. Bosphorus-based arguments on equivalent protection thus figured 
prominently in the parties’ arguments in both cases.231 However, in 
Behrami the European Court held that the impugned actions were not 
attributable to the respondent states, but to the UN. Hence, the Court was 
able to distinguish Bosphorus simply on the account that the respondent 
states had no conflicting obligations.232 In Al-Jedda, on the other hand, the 
House of Lords did not address the interveners’ equivalent protection 
argument. 
So, what of it? Were their Lordships mistaken in not so doing? Had, 
moreover, the European Court properly decided the attribution issue in 
Behrami, should it have applied its Bosphorus reasoning to organizations 
like KFOR empowered by Security Council resolutions, or to the UN 
itself? 
These questions have no easy answer. What is clear, however, is that 
the application of the equivalent protection doctrine to a Security Council 
resolution would go well beyond the Court’s reasoning in Bosphorus. 
Though it is true that Bosphorus also concerned a UN sanctions regime, the 
norm conflict in that case was not between a Security Council resolution 
and the ECHR, but between an EC regulation (and consequently the EC 
Treaty) and the ECHR. Again, none of the equivalent protection cases 
before the European Court dealt with a norm which claimed that it 
prevailed over the ECHR, as a Security Council resolution would under 
Article 103 of the Charter. If there truly is a (quasi-)hierarchical 
relationship between two norms, the lower-ranked norm by definition 
 
Comm’n, Judgment, paras. 318-26 (Sept. 3, 2008), available through database search at http:// 
curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/home. 
 231. See, e.g., Behrami and Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany, and Norway, App. 
Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 80 (2 May 2007), available through the HUDOC 
database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (arguing that “the Convention permitted States to 
transfer sovereign power to an international organisation to pursue common goals if it was necessary to 
comply with international legal obligations and if the organisation imposing the obligation provided 
substantive and procedural protection “equivalent” to that of the Convention (Bosphorus, cited above, 
para. 155): neither NATO nor KFOR provided such protection.”). See also R (In re Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y 
of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332 (appeal taken from Eng.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2007/58.html. 
 232. Behrami, App. Nos. 71412/01& 78166/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 151. See also Guglielmo 
Verdirame, Breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights Resulting from the Conduct of 
International Organisations, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 209, 212-13 (2008) (arguing that the Court’s 
distinguishing of Bosphorus was unpersuasive). 
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cannot set any conditions on the application of the higher-ranked norm, 
even if that condition is the equivalent protection of human rights. 
Barring review of the internal and external validity of the relevant 
Security Council resolution that could avoid the norm conflict with the 
ECHR altogether, the only way for an equivalent protection condition to be 
imposed on a resolution would be for the European Court to say that it is 
not enough that the Charter claims to prevail, but that the ECHR must also 
accept this claim, as national constitutional courts did in their Solange 
jurisprudence in relation to EU law. Now, a general international lawyer 
might say that this would be quite obviously wrong – again, if one can talk 
about these things as right or wrong – as the hierarchical import of Article 
103 is generally accepted by states in their mutual relations, as well as in 
Article 30(1) of the VCLT. This does not change the fact, however, that 
many human rights lawyers in particular would be very tempted by this 
argument.233 The principal goal of the human rights movement has always 
been to limit the power of the state over the individual, even if the state is 
fully democratic, representative and legitimate. Here, suddenly, general 
international law (and lawyers) are saying that human rights should 
kowtow to the UN Security Council, an organ comprised of fifteen states 
which, no matter how important its mission, is not accountable to anyone. 
This tension is quite visible in the cases that we have examined. As we 
have seen, the European Court of Human Rights’s attribution reasoning in 
Behrami is best explained by a reluctance to address the respondent states’ 
Article 103 argument that Resolution 1244 prevailed over Article 5 of the 
ECHR. Further hints include the Court’s frequent remarks about the 
ECHR’s special role as the “constitutional instrument of European public 
order,”234 and, naturally, the Court’s own special role as the guardian of 
that order. Even in Al-Jedda, where a domestic court accepted that Charter 
obligations prevailed over the ECHR by virtue of Article 103, Baroness 
Hale made the remarkable observation that 
It would be so much simpler if the European Convention on Human 
Rights had contained a general provision to the effect that the rights 
guaranteed [therein] are qualified to the extent required or authorised by 
United Nations resolutions.235 
 
 233. See, e.g., IAIN CAMERON, COUNCIL OF EUROPE REPORT, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, DUE PROCESS AND UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL COUNTER-TERRORISM 
SANCTIONS, (2006), http://www.coe.int/t/f/affaires_juridiques/coop%E9ration_juridique/droit_ 
international_public/Textes_&_documents/2006/I.%20Cameron%20Report%2006.pdf (arguing that 
there is no obstacle in applying Bosphorus to the UN). 
 234. Behrami, App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01 para. 145 (quoting Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm 
ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ir., App. No. 45036/98, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H. R. 109, 42 EHRR 1). 
 235. Al-Jedda, para. 125. 
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It would indeed be much simpler if such a provision existed. It would 
also be entirely unnecessary if the Charter, as opposed to the ECHR, was 
seen as the constitutional or foundational instrument of a single legal 
order.236 It is only if this legal order is fragmented that the Charter’s 
authority must not only be asserted, but also accepted in other, supposedly 
self-contained treaties. 
Thus, the application of the equivalent protection doctrine to Security 
Council resolutions would be a major departure from Bosphorus. It would 
also be significantly different from Solange, which was a conditional 
surrender of independence by the undoubtedly distinct national legal orders 
to Community law, which remain distinct precisely because the surrender 
was conditional.237 Applying equivalent protection in cases like Behrami 
and Al-Jedda, on the other hand, would amount to a conditional declaration 
of independence of the ECHR from general international law. 
It is certainly true that at present the European Court of Human Rights 
is not prepared to hold that the UN Charter and its organs have no business 
in saying whether the ECHR applies. Even in Behrami the Court recalled 
that 
the principles underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted and 
applied in a vacuum. [The Court] must also take into account relevant 
rules of international law when examining questions concerning its 
jurisdiction and, consequently, determine State responsibility in 
conformity and harmony with the governing principles of international 
law of which it forms part, although it must remain mindful of the 
Convention’s special character as a human rights treaty.238 
However, Lord Rodger’s view in Al-Jedda that it is “hard to imagine 
that . . . the [European] Court would readily fail to give effect to articles 25 
and 103 of the Charter”239 should also be taken with a few grains of salt. 
The Court is not there yet, but whether it will give in to its fragmentationist 
impulse depends primarily on how big of a threat it perceives the Security 
Council to be to the “constitutional” European public order protecting 
human rights. 
 
 236. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 21, at 164 (stating that Article 103 of the Charter “has been 
taken to suggest that the aims and purposes of the United Nations – maintenance of peace and security 
and promotion and protection of human rights – constitute an international public order to which other 
treaty regimes and the international organizations giving effect to them must conform.”). 
 237. See Dickson, supra note 182, at 10-11 (considering the legal theory that EU Member States’ 
legal systems remain distinct and free to determine the position of other normative systems in relation 
to domestic laws); Raz, supra note 171, at 118 (identifying legal systems’ claimed supremacy). 
 238. Behrami para. 122 (emphasis added). 
 239. Al-Jedda para. 116. 
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CONCLUSION 
If there is one thing that the cases presented above demonstrate, it is 
that courts generally do what they can to avoid norm conflicts. The most 
common are the instances of harmonious interpretation used in numerous 
cases before the European Court, such as Al-Adsani,240 Prince of 
Liechtenstein,241 and Maumousseau.242 To these we can add the equivalent 
protection cases in their intra-systemic, purely conflict avoiding variant, as 
represented by Bosphorus, as opposed to their inter-systemic, Solange 
variant, which presupposes the existence of two separate legal systems. 
Rarer are the cases where norm conflict is genuine and unavoidable. 
Rarer still are those situations in which norm conflict is both unavoidable 
and unresolvable. The paradigmatic case is of course Matthews, but there 
are others, old and new. For example, the famous Soering case243 could be 
taken as an example of an unresolvable conflict between the non-
refoulement component of Article 3 of the ECHR and a valid extradition 
treaty which recognized no such exception.244 Likewise, if the applicant’s 
argument in Al-Jedda that Article 103 of the Charter does not apply to 
Security Council authorizations had been accepted by the House of Lords, 
there would still have been a valid Chapter VII resolution conflicting with 
the equally valid ECHR. Similarly, had the Court in Waite and Kennedy 
not interpreted Article 6 of the ECHR consistently with the practice of 
states to give immunity to international organizations, there would have 
 
 240. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (21 November 2001), 
available through the HUDOC database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (holding that the jus 
cogens prohibition of torture did not conflict with the law of state immunity). See also Jones v. Ministry 
of Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270, 298 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 241. Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, App. No. 42527/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., (27 
June 2001), available through the HUDOC database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (holding 
that the right of access to court in Article 6 of the ECHR did not conflict with the Convention on the 
Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, prohibiting German courts to 
entertain claims arising out of confiscations of German property in the name of reparations for damages 
in World War II). 
 242. Maumousseau and Washington v. Fr., App. No. 39388/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (6 December 2007), 
available through the HUDOC database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (holding that the 
ECHR does not conflict with the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction). 
 243. Soering v. U.K, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (7 July 1989), available through the HUDOC 
database at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (holding that under Article 3 of the ECHR a state 
cannot extradite a person to another state where that person is at a substantial risk of being subjected to 
cruel or inhuman treatment of punishment). 
 244. See Tobias Thienel, Can the Security Council Displace Human Rights Treaties? (Al-Jedda, 
Part 2), OPINIO JURIS, Sept. 5, 2009, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/01/16/can-the-security-council-
displace-human-rights-treaties-al-jedda-part-2/ (discussing the implications of the Al-Jedda holding). 
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been an unresolvable norm conflict between the ECHR and the ESA 
Convention. 
Perhaps the most important insights from examining the practicalities 
of norm conflict can be gained in relation to Article 103 of the Charter. 
There the tension between the integrationist commitment to general 
international law and the potentially fragmentationist commitment to 
human rights is the most palpable. Even the most dedicated adherent of the 
UN Charter can appreciate the potential for abuse inherent in the Security 
Council’s wide discretion. That discretion might or might not get reviewed 
by courts in the future. More importantly, it can be curtailed through the 
use of interpretative presumptions, without stretching the relationship 
between general international law and human rights to a breaking point. 
There is nothing extravagant or earth-shattering in requiring the Council to 
derogate from human rights clearly and unambiguously if and when it 
wishes to do so. If such a request is good enough for democratically elected 
legislatures such as Congress or Parliament, surely it must be good enough 
for the Security Council. 
Being as it is a claim to primacy on behalf of the Charter, Article 103 
also neatly exposes the various normative constitutionalist agendas at play, 
the first one being the less than persuasive idea that the Charter itself is a 
constitution, and that international law as a whole is a constitutional legal 
order.245 On the other end of the spectrum are the undisputedly distinct, 
constitutional domestic legal orders of states. Not even the most die-hard 
generalist international lawyer (except, perhaps, those of the more extreme 
Kelsenian stripe) would argue that Security Council resolutions, or 
domestic statutes implementing such resolutions, would prevail over 
domestic constitutional protections within that municipal legal order. 
But what of those constitutional projects somewhere in the middle of 
the spectrum, such as those of the ECHR or the EU? As we have seen, the 
European Court of Human Rights has shown much unease in Behrami 
regarding the argument that the Security Council can prevail over the 
ECHR, in its view the “constitutional instrument of European public 
order,” while at the same time expressing its sentiment that the ECHR is 
indeed a part of international law. On the other hand is the ECJ’s insistence 
in Kadi that EU law is a constitutional legal order, independent from the 
UN and international law. What makes one a more plausible constitution 
 
 245. See generally Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on 
the Eve of a New Century, 281 RECUEIL DES COURS (1999); Bernhardt, supra note 38. But see Jean 
d’Aspremont & Frédéric Dopagne, Two Constitutionalisms in Europe: Pursuing an Articulation of the 
European and International Legal Orders, 69 HEIDELBERG J. OF INT’L L. (ZAÖRV) (forthcoming, 
2009) (identifying some of the weaknesses of this international constitution project). 
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than the other, and how can one even try answering this question without 
committing to an agenda? 
That the very concept of a “constitution” is completely undefined 
when it is used by either of these courts only exacerbates the problem. The 
word “constitution” can be used to emphasize the importance of a 
document that embodies the fundamental values of a community, or a 
polity. “Constitution” can also be used as a value-neutral term for an 
instrument that sets up organs and institutions and divides their 
relationships, powers and competencies. In both of these senses the EU 
could certainly be said to have a constitution, and at that one which has for 
the most part worked remarkably well and in accord with the distinct, yet 
integrated legal orders of its member states. 
However, “constitution” can also have an additional meaning, that of 
law that recognizes no source of superior law, that does not draw validity 
and legitimacy from any other legal order.246 This “constitution” is the one 
which is of interest to us here, and as we have seen above, this 
“constitution” is truly nothing more than an assumption. The sheer audacity 
of that assumption is perhaps more evident in regard of the ECHR (where it 
is in any case made with much less conviction), than in regard of the EU, if 
for no other reason than because the process (and the project) of 
emancipation of EU law from international law has been going on for 
decades, thereby adding to its plausibility. Nonetheless, it still remains an 
assumption, as is evident from the rather spectacular failure of, to use 
Joseph Weiler’s phrase, that mongrel document that was the Constitutional 
Treaty,247 and indeed from the very fact that the great constitutional 
moments of the EU always expose its roots in an international treaty, 
requiring ratification by all of its member states.248 
It is thus hard to see the bemusement on the part of many EU lawyers 
when their law is still treated as a sub-species of international law, either 
by international lawyers,249 or by domestic constitutional lawyers250 as 
anything other than a defensive reflex. Those who do not share the 
overriding devotion to the constitutionalization of the EU as a legal order 
beholden to no other are simply not persuaded by references to the self-
 
 246. See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 167, at 3-4 (defining different uses of the word “constitution”). 
 247. J.H.H. Weiler, Editorial: Marking the Anniversary of the Universal Declaration; The Irish No 
and the Lisbon Treaty, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647, 652 (2008). 
 248. Id. at 650, 652. 
 249. See Hartley, supra note 167, at 35 (concluding that EC lawyers are reluctant to accept the 
application of international law in Community Law). 
 250. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] October 12, 1993, 89 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 155 (F.R.G.), 33 I.L.M. 395 (1994). 
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serving jurisprudence of the ECJ as evidence that this constitutionalization 
has actually happened. Unless those who employ it – eminent courts 
included – are prepared to openly defend their agendas and assumptions, 
constitution-speak is nothing but gratuitous. 
In that regard, general international lawyers must equally realize that 
justifying the primacy of the Charter simply on the basis that Article 103 
says so might not be reason enough for courts and lawyers who have a 
commitment to some other system, especially if they perceive that system 
as somehow being constitutional in character.251 If one shares the generalist 
agenda, as the present author does – and it must be said that the universality 
or general applicability of international law is nonetheless just that, an 
agenda, a project, if perhaps one less ambitious than the various 
constitutional ones out there – then it must also be acknowledged that it is 
quite naïve to think that general international law will always prevail over 
fragmentationist impulses, or even that it should prevail simply by virtue of 
being general, or because the Charter says so, or that there is a clearly 
correct position. In the final analysis, the debate about fragmentation has 
always been about competing political, ideological and institutional 
interests, not about coherence in the abstract.252 General international law 
will thus prevail only if it accommodates, as far as possible, the concerns of 
these other actors, be they “constitutional” or not.253 If pushed hard enough 
by the Security Council, for example, even the European Court of Human 
Rights will be sorely tempted to declare independence from general 
international law. In accordance with one of the persistent themes of this 
article, such a conflict can and should be avoided. 
 
 
 251. See Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 5, at 559 (arguing that “[e]ven as Article 103may seem 
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 252. See id. at 578. 
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